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ON THE EVASION OF EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS
TOM GINSBURG,* JAMES MELTON** & ZACHARY ELKINS***
ABSTRACT
Executive term limits are precommitments through which the
polity restricts its ability to retain a popular executive down the road.
But in recent years, many presidents around the world have chosen
to remain in office even after their initial maximum term in office
has expired. They have largely done so by amending the constitution,
sometimes by replacing it entirely. The practice of revising higher law
for the sake of a particular incumbent raises intriguing issues that
touch ultimately on the normative justification for term limits in the
first place. This Article reviews the normative debate over term limits
and identifies the key claims of proponents and opponents. It
introduces the idea of characterizing term limits as a type of default
rule executives may overcome if sufficient political support is
apparent. It then turns to historical evidence to assess the probability
of attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, to evade term limits.
It finds that, notwithstanding some high-profile cases, executives
observe term limits with remarkable frequency in consolidated
democracies. The final Part considers alternative institutional
designs that may accomplish some of the goals of term limits, but
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finds that none are likely to provide a perfect substitute. Term limits
have the advantage of clarity, which very likely increases their
enforceability, and they should be considered an effective part of the
arsenal of democratic institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In late June 2009, the Honduran military escorted sitting
President José Manuel Zelaya out of the country for proposing a
referendum on the question whether to amend the constitution—a
proposal that opponents took to be the first step in eliminating
constitutional term limits and paving the way for his reelection.1
The Honduran Constitution contains a “poison pill” clause directed
against this very type of proposal, and Zelaya was promptly re-
placed after adjudication of the issue by the country’s supreme
court.2 The constitutional crisis quickly turned into an international
one, which is unresolved as of this writing: a subsequent election,
won by the conservative opposition candidate, has not been recog-
nized by many countries, and Zelaya’s ultimate fate is still undeter-
mined.3
1. PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HONDURAN-U.S. RELATIONS 5-6 (2009),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34027_20090804.pdf. Zelaya’s proposed refer-
endum would have asked voters whether they were in favor of another referendum to be held
on the next election day on the question whether to revise the constitution. Id. at 3. Zelaya
pointed out that another President would have been elected on the same day as the second
referendum, and so Zelaya himself would not have benefited. Id. at 5.
2. Article 239 reads
A citizen who has held the title of the Executive Power may not be President
or a Designate.
He that violates this provision or advocates its amendment, as well as those
that directly or indirectly support him, shall immediately cease to hold their
respective offices and shall be disqualified for ten years from exercising any
public function.
CONST. HOND. art. 239; see also NORMA C. GUTIÉRREZ, LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., HONDURAS:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES (2009), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/honduras/constitutional-law-
issues.php (discussing the constitutional provisions that give the Honduran Supreme Court
of Justice and the National Congress power to disapprove of the conduct of the President).
This provision triggered the Honduran action. The origins of the poison pill are uncertain,
though the general institution may be traced to fifth century BCE Athens. See GIDEON DORON
& MICHAEL HARRIS, TERM LIMITS 5 (2001). Honduras’s Constitutions of 1957, CONST. HOND.
of 1957, art. 197, and 1982, CONST. HOND. art. 239, adopted similar provisions, as did Peru’s
Constitution of 1933, CONST. PERU of 1933, art. 142, and Guatemala’s Constitution of 1945,
CONST. GUAT. of 1945, art. 133. Perhaps a more effective mechanism would be to require that
any amendments to the executive term apply to only successors and not to the incumbent. See
CONST. BOL. of 1880, art. 135.
3. See PETER J. MEYER & MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HONDURAN-U.S.
RELATIONS 2-7 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34027_20100618.pdf; see
also Mica Rosenberg, Army Overthrows Honduras President in Vote Dispute, REUTERS, Jan.
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Zelaya can hardly be singled out for trying to overcome constitu-
tional limits on his term. In the last fifteen years, many of Zelaya’s
counterparts throughout Latin America have successfully amended
or replaced their constitutions to facilitate term extensions.4 The
past two years seem to have been particularly hazardous. In
January 2009, Bolivian voters approved a new constitution relaxing
limits on the presidential term, thereby allowing incumbent Evo
Morales to run again.5 Three weeks later, Hugo Chávez won a refer-
endum amending the Venezuelan Constitution to do the same
thing.6 In October 2009, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court’s constitu-
tional chamber declared executive term limits to be unconstitu-
tional.7 In February 2010, the Constitutional Court in Colombia
rejected an attempt to re-amend the constitution to allow a third
term for President Alvaro Uribe.8 
Attempts to overturn limits on executive terms have little to do
with the executives’ ideology (Uribe and Chávez are hardly soul-
28, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55R0US20090628. At this writing, Zelaya
is in exile in the Dominican Republic. See New York Times, José Manuel Zelaya News,
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/z/jose_manuel_zelaya/index.html
(last visited Mar. 14, 2011). Trials of those responsible for the coup were held, but none were
punished. MEYER & SULLIVAN, supra, at 8. A similar story could be told with regard to Niger
President Mamadou Tandja, who was deposed in a coup in February 2010. Niger Leader
Mamadou Tandja Held After Military Coup, BBC NEWS, Feb. 18, 2010, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/8522227.stm. Tandja had forced through amendments to the constitution to allow
himself to remain in office after his term expired. Adam Nossiter, President Claims More
Power in Niger’s Disputed Referendum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at A6.
4. See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS 73 n.8 (2009) (discussing actions in Peru in 1993 and Venezuela in 1999);
Ileana Gomez, Comment, Declaring Unconstitutional a Constitutional Amendment: The
Argentine Judiciary Forges Ahead, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 93, 96 n.17, 97 n.18 (2000)
(discussing actions in Argentina in 1993); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: COLOMBIA
(2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm (discussing the 2005 amendment in
Colombia); see also CONST. ARG. § 90 (amended 1994); CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.]
[Constitution] art. 14 (Braz.) (amended 1997).
5. New Bolivia Constitution in Force, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/americas/7877107.stm.
6. See Simon Romero, Chávez Wins Bid To End Term Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009,
at A1. It was Chávez’s second try, having failed in a similar referendum in 2007. Id. at A9.
7. Blake Schmidt, In Nicaragua, Opposition Sees an End Run, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009,
at A6.
8. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COLOMBIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4-6 (2010),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32250_20100423.pdf. The original 1991 consti-
tution limited Presidents to one term, and a 2005 amendment facilitated a second Uribe term.
Id. at 4.
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mates), nor are they restricted to Latin America. Last year
Azerbaijan and Niger also adopted referenda overturning term
limits.9 Similar movements were afoot in the Philippines in the
latter years of President Gloria Arroyo’s term.10 Africa has had its
share: just since 1990, Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Guinea,
Namibia, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda have effected term limit
reform, in the form of relaxing term limits.11 The constitutional
choice of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism in Eastern
Europe has led to tension between temporal rules and ambitious
executives there as well. Vladimir Putin opted to step down from the
Russian presidency in favor of an informally empowered prime
ministership, which provided him with an unlimited tenure, or at
least one at the mercy of a sympathetic legislature controlled by
his party.12 Term limits have recently been relaxed in several
9. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, AZERBAIJAN: VULNERABLE STABILITY 4 (2010), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/azerbaijan/207-azerbaijan-vulnerable-
stability.aspx; Nossiter, supra note 3.
10. In spring 2009, the Philippines House of Representatives passed a resolution that
opened the door for constitutional amendments. See H.R. Res. 1109, 14th Cong., 2d Reg. Sess.,
5 CONG. REC. 512, 517 (Phil. 2009) (enacted); see also Gil C. Cabacungan, Jr. et al., House
Rams Through Con-Ass Resolution, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, June 3, 2009, http://newsinfo.
inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20090603-208528/House-rams-through-Con-ass-
resolution. One issue concerned the scope of foreign investment in certain sectors of the
economy, but at the same time, the House pushed for procedural changes that allowed joint
voting by both houses as a Constituent Assembly for constitutional changes. See INT’L PHIL.
ELECTION OBSERVATION TEAM 2010, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND CHARTER CHANGE (2010),
http://sites.google.com/site/ipeoteam2010/philippine-constitution-and-charter-change. The pro-
posal, known locally by the unfortunate nickname “Con-Ass,” allowed the 278-member House
to dominate the 23-member Senate. See Cabacungan et al., supra. The real subtext, according
to many observers, was President Arroyo’s desire to stay in office when her current term
expired on June 30, 2010. See Leila Salaverria, Solon: Charter Change Can Extend Arroyo
Term, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRER, June 2, 2009, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/
view/20090602-208483/Solon-Charter-change-can-extend-Arroyo-term. But see President
Arroyo Says She Won’t Extend Time in Post, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2009, at A11. Every
President since Corazon Aquino has sought to do the same thing. See INT’L PHIL. ELECTION
OBSERVATION TEAM, supra. The Philippine Constitution currently allows only one six-year
presidential term. CONST. (1987), Art. VII, § 4 (Phil.). 
11. Gideon Maltz, The Case for Presidential Term Limits, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2007, at
128, 129-30; Daniel N. Posner & Daniel J. Young, The Institutionalization of Political Power
in Africa, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2007, at 126, 132. 
12. See C.J. Chivers, Putin Is Installed as Prime Minister, Picking Up Where He Left Off
as President, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, at A12. Putin may run again for President once he has
been out of office for one term, and there are indications that he plans to do just that. Why
Russia Needs Me, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 2010, at 64.
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neighboring countries, including Belarus,13 Kazakhstan,14
Tajikistan,15 and Uzbekistan.16 The same dynamics operate at the
subnational level, where executives of regional and even municipal
governments face many of the same incentives and institutional
constraints. Indeed, Michael Bloomberg’s successful amendment of
New York City’s charter in order to facilitate his third mayoral term
had some people comparing the city to a “banana republic.”17 These
varied cases suggest that the evasion of term limits is widespread.
This latest wave of term limit evasions invites a number of
questions. First, how should we think of this phenomenon from a
normative perspective? Alexander Hamilton and many of the
Founders thought term limits would invite mischief by ex-Presi-
dents and argued against their inclusion in the U.S. Constitution;18
others, including Thomas Jefferson, thought that term limits were
necessary to curb executive ambition.19 As term limits have grown
in popularity over time, some have called for their universal adop-
tion in presidential systems as a core feature of democracy.20 But
term limits have been criticized on a number of grounds, most
obviously that they restrict democratic choice.21 Part I of this Article
reviews the arguments for and against term limits. It considers
motivations grounded in the prevention of tyranny and the protec-
tion of the institutional integrity of democracy, including countering
13. STEVEN WOEHREL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BELARUS: BACKGROUND AND U.S. POLICY
CONCERNS 2 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32534.pdf.
14. Kazakhstan Parliament Abolishes Presidential Term Limits on Nazarbayev, VOICE
AM., May 18, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2007-05-18-voa6.html.
15. Christopher Walker, East: The ‘Leader for Life’ Governance Model, RADIO FREE EUR.,
Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079557.html.
16. Id.
17. Posting of Keith to the Call Blog, http://www.ny1.com/content/123674/bloomberg-says-
new-yorkers-should-decide-term-limits (Aug. 13, 2010, 15:23 EDT); see also David W. Chen
& Michael Barbaro, Bloomberg Wins 3rd Term in Tight Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A1.
18. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text; see also Lloyd N. Cutler, The
Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limits for Federal Office, in THE POLITICS AND LAW
OF TERM LIMITS 99, 102-03, 104 n.33 (Edward H. Crane & Roger Pilon eds., 1994); Mark P.
Petracca, Restoring “The University in Rotation”: An Essay in Defense of Term Limitation, in
THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS, supra, at 57, 65.
19. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
20. See Maltz, supra note 11, at 128-29, 141.
21. See Paul Jacob, From the Voters with Care, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS,
supra note 18, at 27, 38-39.
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the incumbency advantage in electoral competition.22 It also intro-
duces the idea that term limits may be most profitably thought of as
default rules that may be overcome through constitutional amend-
ment processes.23 Even if term limits appear rigid, they may be
overcome by executives with sufficiently strong political support.24
Many of the theoretical arguments about term limits turn on
empirical claims about the likely behavior of the incumbent in his
or her last period of office, an issue about which we have little
evidence. Other empirical data, however, may inform the broader
normative debate.25 The Honduras situation suggests that term
limits may themselves induce a constitutional crisis in some circum-
stances.26 When a popular leader overturns term limits to remain in
office, there may be significant collateral damage to the constitu-
tional order. If such occurrences are frequent and their conse-
quences severe, we ought to think twice about the suggestion that
term limits be seen as a core feature of democratic constitutions. To
evaluate this possibility, Part II asks the positive question of how
frequently term limit evasions occur. It begins by describing the
prevalence and type of limits on executive tenure across time and
space. We then ask whether term limits “work,” in the sense of
actually and effectively constraining executives from remaining in
office. Part III takes advantage of a unique set of data on the
content of historical constitutions.27 We conclude that term limits
are surprisingly effective in constraining executives from extending
their terms, at least in democracies. There is no evidence that term
limits are associated with the death or disability of democracy, even
if in some circumstances they may induce early constitutional re-
placement.28
Notwithstanding this generally positive assessment, Part IV
examines institutional alternatives to term limits. The normative
question about term limits must be considered as one of compara-
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part I.D.
24. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying note 141.
26. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
27. See Comparative Constitutions Project, http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject
.org (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
28. See infra Part III.C.
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tive institutional choice, and we evaluate whether alternatives may
mitigate some of the negative effects of term limits identified in the
theoretical literature. Part IV considers several ideas, including
manipulating the length of the executive term, shedding presiden-
tial powers, handicapping electoral incumbents, and inducing retire-
ment. None of the conceivable alternatives to restrict executive
tenure, however, are likely to substitute for term limits. As a nor-
mative matter, then, term limits seem to be an effective form of
constitutional precommitment. Despite high-profile evasions in
some countries,29 the overall story seems to be of an institution that
operates as an effective constraint in most times and places. 
I. THE DEBATE OVER TERM LIMITS
Term limits have been part of the arsenal of institutional design
for millennia, but have assumed particular significance in modern
presidential democracies. Presidentialism is characterized by the
election of a single executive for a fixed term of office, and critics of
this form of government have focused on its resulting inflexibility,
particularly as compared to parliamentary government.30 Limits on
the number of terms, not just their length, add yet another dimen-
sion of inflexibility.31 When the modern presidency was designed in
Philadelphia, the Framers engaged in extensive debates over the
length of the term and whether the executive could stand for re-
election.32 This Part reviews the normative debate over term limits.
A. The Rationale for Fixed Terms: Temporary Insulation
To understand term limits, we must begin by understanding why
political systems have fixed terms for the executive in the first
place. Fixed terms are a typical feature of presidential systems, and
29. See supra notes 6, 12, 17 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a
Difference?, in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3, 9-10 (Juan J. Linz & Arturo
Valenzuela eds., 1994).
31. See, e.g., Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, J. DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at
51, 61.
32. See CHARLES W. STEIN, THE THIRD TERM TRADITION: ITS RISE AND COLLAPSE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 3-6 (1943).
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are contrasted with the prototypical parliamentary system in which
the executive may be removed by the legislature at any time.33 We
do not wish to rehash the extensive debate over these two forms of
government here, as it forms a central issue in the discipline of
comparative politics.34 We ourselves prefer to refer to the forms as
popular-election and assembly-confidence systems, rather than
presidential or parliamentary, because the latter terms often con-
note a set of elective attributes that, it turns out, are not especially
elective.35 Moreover, we wish to focus on only one aspect of the
distinction, a central tradeoff in the choice between systems. 
Under either a popular-election or assembly-confidence system,
periodic elections provide a primary mechanism of ensuring ac-
countability of officeholders.36 Allowing an executive to remain in
office for a set period, as is typical of popular-election systems,
insulates that executive from short-term fluctuations in political
opinion. This can facilitate the undertaking of policies that may
entail short-term costs, but produce benefits in the midterm.37
Insulation must be tempered with periodic elections, which confirm
the mandate of the officeholder for another term in office.38 Thus
fixed terms allow for periods of insulation set off by elections that
secure legitimacy and accountability. In addition, the president and
the legislature are independent of each other. In assembly-confi-
dence systems, by contrast, the executive and the legislature exist
in a certain codependence, in which one office may be dissolved by
the other at any given time.39
33. To be sure, this is an oversimplification, and some have argued that parliamentary
systems can accommodate fixed terms. See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism
and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 551 (2009). Albert also points out that the
potential for recall in presidential systems is the functional equivalent of the vote of no
confidence in parliamentary systems. Id. at 560-61.
34. See generally JOSÉ ANTONIO CHEIBUB, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (2007) (reviewing scholarly debate over presidentialism and parliamentarism).
35. See José Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism
and Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Form 30 (Jan. 14, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
36. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is ... And Is Not, J.
DEMOCRACY, Summer 1991, at 75, 80.
37. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002).
38. See id.
39. CHEIBUB, supra note 34, at 10; Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Constitutions and
Economic Policy, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY 81, 101 (Roger
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The rationale for fixing terms does not carry with it a universally
applicable criterion for what the length of those terms should be. It
is difficult ex ante to determine the “optimal” term for an office-
holder, by which we mean the length of time in which the benefits
of policy insulation outweigh the costs of reduced accountability. As
noted below, there is surprisingly little variation across written
constitutions in length of executive term,40 even though the time
required to develop, implement, and evaluate policies will depend
on a number of variables that differ across time and space. These
variables may include other features of the constitutional structure,
such as the existence of veto players that may make policies easier
or more difficult to adopt and implement.41 They also include exog-
enous conditions, such as the rate of social and political change,
which will affect the demand for new policies and new leaders.42
Other factors, such as the structure of the party system and in-
dividual characteristics of the leader, are surely relevant. It is also
likely that the optimal term would be different across policy areas,
as costs and benefits of policies may be revealed at different rates,
and so a fixed term for a single executive is simply the aggregate of
an optimizing function over individual issue areas. The approach of
fixing terms to a set number of years is to adopt a bright-line rule
for periodic elections, notwithstanding the fact that the optimal
amount of time for an executive to stay in office may in some
instances be much shorter or longer. 
Juan Linz, among others, places fixed terms at the center of his
criticisms of presidential democracy.43 In addition to other vices,
Linz sees presidential systems as institutionalizing conflict between
branches, leading to deadlock and higher incentives to take extra-
constitutional action.44 As Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully put
it, “[B]ecause of the fixed terms of office, if a president is unable to
D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006).
40. See infra text accompanying note 178.
41. See GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS 2 (2002).
42. See, e.g., Martin Krakowski, Inflation, Unemployment, and Presidential Tenure, 83 J.
POL. ECON. 867, 868 (1975) (suggesting that the length of presidential terms could vary based
on the rates of inflation and unemployment).
43. See Linz, supra note 30; Linz, supra note 31.
44. See Linz, supra note 30, at 10.
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implement her/his program, there is no alternative but deadlock.”45
Although the current state of the literature is more agnostic,46 the
assumptions of the Linzian position are still widely held.47 The focus
here is not on fixed terms per se, but on whether a system ought to
limit the number of fixed terms a single individual may hold. This
is a second-order decision constitutional designers face once they
choose to adopt a fixed-term, popularly elected president.
B. Arguments for Executive Term Limits
The origins of executive term limits go back to the ancient
republics. In one of the earliest definitions of democracy, Aristotle
listed as a key characteristic of democracy that “no office should
ever be held twice by the same person.”48 Accordingly, Greek city-
states are known to have imposed term limits of one-tenth of a year
on some of the officials who were elected by random lottery.49 In
Athens, there was the additional restriction that no individual could
serve more than two years on the governing council in the course of
a lifetime.50 The rationale for term limits in these early democracies
was the idea of rotation of office.51 Democracy, in the view of the
ancient Greeks, required that citizens have the experience of both
“ruling and being ruled in turn,” and this principle was best effect-
uated with a strict limitation on tenure in public office, so as to
maximize the number of citizens that could govern.52
45. Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully, Introduction to BUILDING DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 33 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully
eds., 1995). But see Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints:
Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643-
45 (2010) (arguing that a separation of powers does not induce gridlock).
46. See, e.g., CHEIBUB, supra note 34, at 166-68.
47. Id. at 7, 13-14.
48. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 258 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford
University Press 1976).
49. C. HIGNETT, A HISTORY OF THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION TO THE END OF THE FIFTH
CENTURY B.C. 237 (Clarendon Press 1967) (1952).
50. GIDEON DORON & MICHAEL HARRIS, TERM LIMITS 5 (2001).
51. See HIGNETT, supra note 49, at 227.
52. DORON & HARRIS, supra note 50 (quoting Mark P. Petracca, Rotation in Office: The
History of an Idea, in LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 19, 20 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J.
Malbin eds., 1992)).
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In polities larger than a city-state, the ideal of each citizen having
a real possibility of holding public office is a fiction. Accordingly, we
have observed some evolution in normative thinking about the
rationale for term limits. In the modern consideration of term limits,
the themes of preventing tyranny and protecting electoral competi-
tion have come to the fore, with ideas about self-government losing
salience.53 
The touchstone of current views is the American founding. The
Framers debated the length of the presidential term, including the
question whether reelection ought to be allowed.54 The initial ver-
sion of the Virginia Plan submitted to the Constitutional Conven-
tion provided that the President would be ineligible for a second
term.55 This position remained in place while the Framers debated
various proposals for term length. Until close to the end of the
Constitutional Convention, the Framers’ plan was to have the
President limited to a single seven-year term.56 Many of the
Framers were concerned that the prospect of reelection would force
the President to curry favor with Congress, an undesirable outcome
that they associated with failing to take into account the national
interest.57 In the end, of course, the U.S. Constitution initially omit-
ted term limits, much to the chagrin of Thomas Jefferson, who
declared the omission to be one of the defects of the document.58
Those in favor of term limits focus on the potential for tyranny by
an executive. As Simón Bolívar put it, before reversing his position
once he assumed executive office himself,
Nothing is more perilous than to permit one citizen to retain
power for an extended period. The people become accustomed to
obeying him, and he forms the habit of commanding them;
herein lays [sic] the origins of usurpation and tyranny.... Our
53. See, e.g., id. at xiii-xv.
54. See STEIN, supra note 32, at 4.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 6 (describing the position of George Mason of Virginia).
58. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in SOMETHING THAT
WILL SHAKE THE WORLD 280-82 (Susan Dunn ed., 2006) (expressing concern over the
incumbency advantage and stating that “[t]he power of removing [the President] every fourth
year by the vote of the people is a power which will not be exercised”).
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citizens must with good reason learn to fear lest the magistrate
who has governed them long will govern them forever.59
 
Bolívar identified the perverse advantage of incumbency: the
current officeholder may, either intentionally or not, come to seem
like the only option. 
Although it is possible that the incumbency advantage is simply
a function of better information on the current officeholder than on
the challenger, it is also possible that it results from cognitive biases
in favor of stability: better the proverbial “devil you know” than a
possibly unproven candidate. In modern psychological terms, this
implicates the status quo bias, through which people stick with
earlier choices without adequately considering alternatives.60 In
addition, incumbents have well-documented advantages in political
competitions because of agenda control, greater media coverage, and
control over the instruments of power.61 Incumbents may even be
tempted to improperly use public resources in pursuit of remaining
in office.62
Besides these direct advantages, incumbency also has indirect
effects on political competition. Incumbency may indirectly serve as
a barrier to entry, so that other good candidates may refrain from
entering a contest against an established incumbent.63 Analogizing
to antitrust law, regulation may be an appropriate solution to ad-
dress these potential distortions in the political marketplace.64
Term limits form a kind of precommitment by the polity to con-
sider alternative candidates. Like all precommitments, term limits
rest on a claim that some judgments are better made earlier rather
than later because the principal cannot be trusted to make the right
59. John M. Carey, The Reelection Debate in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS: INSTITUTIONS, ACTORS, AND PROCESSES 79, 80 (William C.
Smith ed., 2009).
60. Daniel Kahnemann, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 198 (1991). 
61. See, e.g., Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, PRESIDENTS AS CANDIDATES 105 (2003); Jacob, supra
note 21, at 27, 30-32.
62. See, e.g., Sean Scully, Corruption Scandal Scrambles Pennsylvania Politics, TIME, Jan.
18, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1954271,00.html.
63. Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 154-55, 159
(1997).
64. Id. at 156-65 (developing the antitrust analogy).
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call down the road.65 As an incumbent serves in office, the ability of
the polity to evaluate performance and provide electoral discipline
somehow becomes distorted.66 Hence, there is a need to categorically
restrict candidates from re-upping. At the time of adopting a consti-
tution, the polity limits its own will down the road, a paradigmatic
precommitment.67 The precommitment is grounded in the judgment
ex ante that discarding all executives after a fixed term will produce
aggregate benefits, even though we will lose the services of some
executives that we would really want to keep.68
A precommitment to change executives may have beneficial
upstream effects on the selection of candidates who make them-
selves available to run for office. Knowing ex ante that their tenure
in public office is, at least presumptively, limited, self-aggrandizing
agents may be deterred from seeking office in the first place.69
Agents who wish to rule for life will be screened out, or at least will
be discouraged from running for public office.70 In contrast, a term
limit will encourage agents who have moderate ambition to enter
political competition.71 Term limits thus affect the labor pool of can-
didates.
Another positive effect of term limits may operate on potential
challengers for power. In the absence of term limits, an incumbent
65. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 272 (1995).
66. See, e.g., Robert S. Erikson, The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections,
3 POLITY 395 (1971) (suggesting that name recognition distorts voters’ evaluations of
candidates).
67. Indeed, term limits exemplify an institution that is better analyzed using
precommitment theory than agency cost theories of constitutionalism. See Tom Ginsburg &
Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1594 & n.29 (2010) (arguing that
agency costs drive many aspects of constitutions, but not all). Term limits operate even if the
agent retains popularity, and indeed only make sense because the agent may retain
popularity. The polity limits its own will down the road, even if there are no agency costs.
68. See George Will, Term Limits Aren’t Appropriate in “Tough Times”?, TOWNHALL.COM,
Oct. 12, 2008, http://townhall.com/columnists/GeorgeWill/2008/10/12/term_limits_arent_
appropriate_in_tough_times (stating that advocates of term limits believe that “the benefits
of churning the talent pool exceed the costs of limiting tenures”).
69. See GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 145 (1992). But see Bruce E. Cain & Marc A. Levin, Term Limits,
2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 163, 176 (1999) (arguing that deterrence will occur only if the ambition
of the agent is “static” as opposed to “progressive”).
70. See WILL, supra note 69, at 200-01.
71. See id. at 201; John H. Fund, Term Limitation: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, in
LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS 225, 232-36 (Gerald Benjamin & Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992).
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may govern for too long, and potential challengers may grow im-
patient. The precommitment to rotating leaders will assure such
challengers that they will indeed have a chance of winning office.72
Broadly speaking, then, term limits reduce the stakes of politics,
and may prevent alternative candidates from resorting to unconsti-
tutional action.73
In preventing incumbent leaders from running, term limits
change the incentives for politicians in their final period of office.
Some have argued that term limits will lead executives to focus
more on the public interest if they are not concerned about the need
for reelection, even if they may be underpowered in their lame-duck
status.74 Certainly, term limits reduce the risk of manipulation of
policy by the executive to maintain power, at least to the extent that
the restrictions are effectively enforced.75
Term limits also promote a party-based, as opposed to person-
ality-based, vision of democracy. Term limits assume that ulti-
mately no one individual, no matter how competent and exalted, has
a monopoly on the skills needed to govern. By forcing even highly
competent and popular leaders to stand down, term limits encour-
age the cultivation of successors.76 They also encourage the creation
of robust political parties to maintain the leader’s policies into the
future.77 Channeling ambition to others can have the important
benefit of preventing personality from trumping policy.78
72. See Mark P. Petracca, Term Limits Work Just Fine, Thank You, L.A. TIMES, July 23,
2006, at M3 (arguing that term limits “check the power of incumbency, increase opportunities
for citizens to serve in public office and provide for a modicum of electoral competitiveness”).
73. See Barry Weingast, Designing Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 39, at 343, 344 (arguing that “all
successful constitutions lower the stakes of politics” and that “citizens are less likely to
support extra-constitutional action to protect themselves when constitutions protect what
they hold most dear”). 
74. See, e.g., JOHN M. CAREY, TERM LIMITS AND LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 190-91
(1996).
75. See Petracca, supra note 18, at 61.
76. Cf. Maltz, supra note 11, at 133 (stating that electoral authoritarian rulers who do not
have limits shy away from successors because successors make them dispensable). A leader
who knew he had to step down, however, would cultivate a successor.
77. See Petracca, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that amateur legislators help with party
building, and term limits foster amateurs’ presence in legislatures).
78. For an example of a leader who has refused to create a party or designate a successor,
consider Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan. See Scott Baldauf, Karzai, A Man with No Party,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1026/p01s03-
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In short, there are considerable arguments in favor of term limits.
Term limits are seen as having a beneficial effect on the democratic
system as a whole by minimizing the potential for tyranny, and
shifting the focus away from an individual candidate toward policies
and political structures to implement them.79 However, as the next
Section will demonstrate, there are also formidable theoretical
arguments against term limits.
C. Arguments Against Executive Term Limits
The primary objection to term limits is rooted in concerns about
representation. In this view, term limits serve as an artificial and
illiberal constraint on the choice of the polity to retain an executive
whom it may otherwise wish to keep.80 In theory, the polity can
always vote the incumbent out of office if it chooses, so there is no
need to categorically limit candidates from continued participation
in elections. This argument has been adopted by both scholars and
courts.81 
The standard rebuttal is that term limits are typically adopted
by democratic majorities as part of a package of constitutional
commitments.82 Like other precommitments, term limits may be
reversed by downstream amendment. But inclusion of such limits
in the constitutional text shifts the default position toward auto-
matic removal of officeholders after a certain period. This may have
illiberal consequences when the voters prefer to retain the person in
office. Indeed, it is only because of such presumed efficacy that the
Framers did not adopt term limits in the first place:83 an unpopular
leader needs no limit on the number of terms she can serve.
Opponents of term limits also argue that governance, like other
activity, requires experience, and that practitioners of government
may get better over time.84 This argument was associated with
wosc.html.
79. See Thomas E. Mann, Congressional Term Limits: A Bad Idea Whose Time Should
Never Come, in THE POLITICS AND LAW OF TERM LIMITS, supra note 18, at 84.
80. STEIN, supra note 32, at 14-15.
81. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995).
82. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
83. See STEIN, supra note 32, at 7-11 (recounting the Framers’ debate over reeligibility
and noting that term limits were not adopted in the Constitution).
84. Cf. Nelson W. Polsby, Constitutional Mischief: What’s Wrong with Term Limitations,
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David Hume, who critiqued James Harrington’s scheme of govern-
ment in The Commonwealth of Oceana on the grounds that forcing
executives out of power would deprive the polity of the best possible
leaders.85 Hume saw no benefit in artificial rotation among office-
holders, and suggested that an ideal scheme of government would
not have term limits.
The argument about expertise was repeated by Alexander
Hamilton, a principal opponent of term limits in debates over the
U.S. Constitution. Hamilton thought that a limitation on the pres-
idential term involved “the banishing [of] men from stations in
which, in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might be
of the greatest moment to the public interest or safety.”86 Hamilton’s
concern was not only experience but the related concern of a
uniquely qualified leader. This may be particularly important in
new states or fragile democracies,87 and many of the Framers may
have had George Washington in mind when thinking about the
problem of term limits. Artificially forcing uniquely qualified indi-
viduals from office, it is argued, may deprive the state of the best
possible leadership and risk undermining the social basis for the
state.88 The list of people who have made such claims, however,
invites skepticism.89
AM. PROSPECT, June 23, 1991, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=constitutional_
mischief _whats_wrong_with_term_limitations.
85. DAVID HUME, POLITICAL DISCOURSES 283 (1752) (“[R]otation is inconvenient, by
throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals, out of public employments.”). Hume’s essay
emphasizes the cultivation of expertise over time, limiting higher office to those who have
already held lower office.
86. STEIN, supra note 32, at 15; see also id. at 12 (noting that Charles Cotesworth
expressed a similar idea).
87. See generally Maltz, supra note 11 (examining the effects of term limits on
democracies around the world from 1992 to 2006).
88. STEIN, supra note 32, at 15 (discussing Hamilton’s views).
89. Compare Nursultan Nazarbayev, who is in the process of amending the constitution
to name himself President of Kazakhstan for life, Feruza Jani & Irina Yermakova, Why Would
Nursultan Nazarbayev Want To Be President for Life?, FERGHANA, May 23, 2007,
http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=1985, with Nelson Mandela, the embodiment of South
Africa’s democratic transition who retired on time, Leon Marshall, Nelson Mandela Bows Out
of Public Life, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, June 2, 2004, http://news.nationalgeographic
.com/news/2004/06/0602_040602_mandela.html, and George Washington, who is seen as the
“indispensable man” at the founding, JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE
INDISPENSABLE MAN 214 (1974). Washington, however, privately expressed concern that term
limits may exclude the most qualified leader during a time of emergency. STEIN, supra note
32, at 12.
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Opponents expressed another concern about the role of ex-
leaders. In Federalist No. 72, Hamilton worried about the effects on
politics “to have half a dozen men who had credit enough to raise
themselves to the seat of the supreme magistracy wandering among
the people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place, which
they were destined never more to possess.”90 Such effects are not un-
common in Latin America: Juan Perón in Argentina, for example,
cast a long shadow over politics long after his term of office ended.91
In the United States, at least, ex-Presidents seem to thrive out of
office—sometimes as minimally meddlesome statesmen—and cause
very little mischief.92 Gideon Maltz, who has written in favor of
term limits, recommends the practice of maintaining the trappings
of executive office, such as a security detail or honorary positions,
as a way to incentivize more statesman-like behavior by ex-Presi-
dents.93
Hamilton was particularly concerned with the potential for a
term-limited leader to manipulate his power to remain in office. As
he put it, “as the object of his ambition would be to prolong his
power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself of
the emergency to evade or refuse a degradation from his place.”94
For this reason Hamilton favored a life term during good behavior,
a kind of elective monarchy for the United States that, in any event,
would not have a large quantum of power.95 
Another Founding Father, Gouverneur Morris, eloquently made
a similar argument that the final term would induce unconstitu-
90. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 398-99.
91. See Mugambi Jouet, The Failed Invigoration of Argentina’s Constitution: Presidential
Omnipotence, Repression, Instability, and Lawlessness in Argentine History, 39 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 409, 441 (2008).
92. For accounts of the activities of past Presidents after they left office, see generally
MAX J. SKIDMORE, AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE: FORMER PRESIDENTS AS PRIVATE CITIZENS (2004);
PAUL B. WICE, PRESIDENTS IN RETIREMENT: ALONE AND OUT OF OFFICE (2009); Douglas
Brinkley, The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The “Hands-On” Legacy of Our Thirty-Ninth
President, 20 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 505 (1996). But see JOHN HEILEMANN & MARK HALPERIN,
GAME CHANGE: OBAMA AND THE CLINTONS, MCCAIN AND PALIN, AND THE RACE OF A LIFETIME
6 (2010) (covering Bill Clinton’s substantial involvement in the presidential campaign of his
wife Hillary Clinton).
93. Maltz, supra note 11, at 140.
94. STEIN, supra note 32, at 7.
95. Id.
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tional behavior by a leader.96 Should the possibility of reelection be
foreclosed, he argued, a leader may seek to retain it by the sword.97
Furthermore, the short but definite period of a single term would
tempt the President to accumulate wealth quickly while in office, as
there would be no electoral discipline to induce public-regarding
behavior.98 It was this argument that seemed to prevail in the
heated final days of the Constitutional Convention; though the final
text remains silent on reeligibility, it was assumed to be permissi-
ble.99 As described below in Part II, an unwritten norm developed
restricting any individual to two presidential terms.
One point of disagreement apparent in the debate is that
opponents of term limits tend toward a different interpretation of
likely executive behavior in the final term.100 Although proponents
argue that term limits will free up the executive to act in the public
interest,101 opponents note that the lack of electoral check may also
give way to corruption and pursuit of policies for personal gain.102 It
may therefore make sense to incentivize leaders with the possibility
of continued office to avoid final-term problems. Ultimately,
whether public- or private-regarding motivation predominates in
the final term of office is an empirical question on which, to our
knowledge, there has been little scholarship.
Another empirical question unresolved in the current literature
concerns the interaction of the incumbency advantage and time.
Specifically, does the degree of incumbency advantage generally
remain constant over time, or does it increase or decrease? If it
generally decreases after a certain point, term limits may be un-
necessary. On the other hand, if it continues to increase with the
term of the incumbent, term limits are more justifiable. The liter-
ature analyzing the slope of the incumbency advantage is relatively
96. Id. at 9.
97. Id.; see also id. at 13 (discussing Madison’s similar views).
98. Id. at 9.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Becky Cain, Term Limits: Not the Answer to What Ails Politics, in THE POLITICS AND
LAW OF TERM LIMITS, supra note 18, at 45, 47; Carey, supra note 59, at 160-63.
101. Carey, supra note 59, at 190-91.
102. Much of the debate over constitutional reform in South Korea, for example, focuses
on the problems of the single-term, five-year presidency, most of whose occupants have
engaged in massive corruption. See ROBERT E. BEDESKI, THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTH
KOREA 40 (1994).
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limited,103 but the little evidence available suggests that most of the
benefits from incumbency materialize in politicians’ first reelection
bid, the so-called “sophomore surge.”104 With no other evidence, we
assume that the slope is flat for purposes of the analysis in this
Article.
D. A Qualified Approach: Term Limits as Default Rules
Term limits involve a tradeoff: restricting voter choice in order to
preserve an equitable political marketplace. Limits are perceived as
both antidemocratic and essential to preserve democracy,105 and
much of the argument turns on underspecified claims regarding the
optimal term of office, the effects of incumbency, and the nature of
final-period problems.106 In this Section, we analyze constitutional
term limits from the perspective of default rules, showing that term
limits are more flexible than they appear to be.107
Return to the rationale for a fixed term. Fixed terms provide for
insulation, allowing pursuit of midterm over short-term consider-
ations.108 Ex ante, however, the optimal duration of executive tenure
is not obvious, and may vary with a number of considerations, in-
cluding aspects of the international environment, domestic stability,
and the presence of alternative leaders.109 We cannot be sure that
the blanket fixed term specified for the executive is ideal in any
sense. An assembly-confidence system may allow for more flexibility
in response to changing conditions, in that underperforming exec-
utives may be removed relatively easily.110 But although assembly-
confidence systems address the problem of the underperforming
leader staying too long, they allow for performing leaders to stay in
103. For a source of data on the incumbency advantage and a review of research on the
topic, see Roy A. Dawes & A. Hunter Bacot, Electoral Career Patterns and Incumbency
Advantage in the U.S. House of Representatives, 23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 575 (1998). 
104. See id. at 577-78.
105. See Jacob, supra note 21, at 27, 39.
106. See supra Part I.B-C.
107. For definitions and analysis of default and immutable rules, see generally Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-92 (1989).
108. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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office forever, and hence exacerbate incumbency advantages. Term
limits, on the other hand, place an upper limit on the duration of
service, mitigating incumbency advantages but raising the possibil-
ity that an effective leader will be forced out of office too early.
Term limits, however, are no more entrenched than any other
constitutional provision (the unusual Honduran “poison pill”111
notwithstanding). The possibility that term limits may be bypassed
by constitutional amendment—either negotiated or obtained
through referendum—or replacement suggests that executive term
limits may be usefully thought of as merely default rules. They may
be effective only so long as the polity does not amend around them.
To be sure, they raise the cost of extending tenure. But a truly
popular executive will find them of little constraint. Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, for example, initially denied wishing to run again
in 1940 after his second term, in keeping with the unwritten
constitutional norm of the time.112 But with the New Deal in full
swing, his popularity was such that his party insisted that he run
again.113 Term limits did form some constraint, in that Roosevelt’s
popularity had to be high enough to overcome the default norm of
the unwritten constitution: no doubt some unspecified number of
voters who might have otherwise been inclined to vote for him
declined to do so because of the unwritten limitation. But the
threshold was overcome. Once the Twenty-Second Amendment was
adopted, the degree of political support necessary shifted again: a
future President would require enough support to sustain a consti-
tutional amendment reversing the Twenty-Second Amendment, a
much higher threshold.114 
Term limits may thus be said to raise the degree of political
support required for an executive to maintain office from the
ordinary electoral majority baseline to the higher constitutional
amendment threshold, which we may think of as a supermajority,
111. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
112. See DORON & HARRIS, supra note 50, at 18; STEIN, supra note 32, at 323.
113. See DORON & HARRIS, supra note 50, at 18-19.
114. Formal amendment procedures under the U.S. Constitution are among the most
difficult in existence. Jack Knight, Institutionalizing Constitutional Interpretation, in
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 361, 380 (John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove
& Jonathan Riley eds., 2001). On the ambiguities of the Twenty-Second Amendment, see
BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR
ENEMIES (forthcoming 2011).
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although amendment provisions vary. It is not clear ex ante that the
amendment threshold is always optimal, however, in terms of
offsetting the incumbency advantage. It may be that the amend-
ment threshold is too low, so that it does not constrain the executive
in any real way. Alternatively, the amendment threshold may be so
high as to exceed the incumbency advantage. In such instances, a
popular president whom the polity would otherwise prefer to retain
will be forced to leave office because of term limits. 
To illustrate, suppose that the net advantage of being an in-
cumbent in presidential elections is 10 percent, which is the average
incumbency advantage for members of the U.S. Congress since
1975.115 This means that a candidate will obtain the additional votes
of 10 percent of the electorate relative to the support she would
receive were she not an incumbent. Suppose further that the in-
cumbent candidate is forbidden by the constitution from running for
a second term, but the constitution may be amended by referendum
with the support of two-thirds of the population. In this example,
the amendment supermajority exceeds a majority plus the incum-
bency advantage. An incumbent who has the support of 62 percent
of the population would have been elected by a majority even
without the incumbency advantage, but will be prevented from
running by term limits. An incumbent who has the support of 70
percent of the public, on the other hand, will be able to secure an
amendment and remain in office. Arguably the term limit rule in
this example is excessively restrictive: it does more than simply
offset the incumbency advantage. 
By providing for an absolute upper bound on executive service,
without regard to external conditions, term limits are a blunt
instrument to deal with a delicate but real problem—the proverbial
sledgehammer used to crack a nut. It is possible, of course, that in
establishing a fixed maximum term to be applied to all executives,
we manage to choose a period of years that is perfectly optimal, such
that it allows the executive sufficient time to develop policies
without fear of losing power.116 We may force some truly popular
executives to stand down in favor of less competent candidates, but
115. Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Estimating Incumbency Advantage Without Bias, 34
AM. J. POL. SCI. 1142, 1158 fig.2 (1990). 
116. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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the cost is worth it because of the risks of declining performance
from an executive that stays past her optimal date.117 In short, we
might by chance set the maximum term for a period that is, as
Goldilocks would put it, neither too hot nor too cold. But this seems
unlikely given variation in the myriad factors that will affect the
optimal term.118
If the default rule is not sufficiently sensitive to real world con-
ditions, it is likely to provoke pressures for change. In the constitu-
tional context, however, these pressures may lead to constitutional
crises, as the Honduran experience demonstrates.119 By constitu-
tional crises, we mean a situation in which constitutional politics
become so heated that they suspend the operation of normal
politics.120 Constitutional politics are those that involve struggles
over the meaning and enforcement of the constitution; ordinary
politics involve issues to be decided within the governance structure
established by the constitution.121 When an executive suspends the
operation of term limits in order to remain in power, there is likely
to be a severe reaction from other parts of the political system and
this may suspend ordinary political processes.122 This was one of
the concerns that Hamilton raised in opposition to the limited and
fixed term of office.123 Even if the crisis does not result in violence,
the personalization of the conflict—over whether a particular indi-
vidual may retain office—distinguishes a term limits crisis from
other types of constitutional crisis that may arguably have benefi-
cial effects down the road.124
Suppose an executive remains highly popular and reaches the end
of his or her term. Although supporters may argue for an extension
of the term, other members of the public may demand that the
constitution be enforced as written. Four resolutions to the crisis are
117. See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
991 (2008) (discussing nondisruptive constitutional politics).
121. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7, 119-25 (1962) (differentiating between
operational and constitutional decisions).
122. See, e.g., supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
124. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 120, at 1010-11.
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possible, all with varying welfare consequences. The possible
resolutions are (1) the executive departs, (2) the executive remains
and amends the constitution, (3) the executive remains and replaces
the constitution, or (4) the executive remains and ignores the
constitution. 
The first outcome—the only one in which term limits work as
designed—is seemingly unproblematic, except for those who reason-
ably argue that the executive’s departure denies the majority’s
will.125 The second and third outcomes represent two methods of
constitutional adaptation, with one preserving the constitution and
the other eviscerating it. Although we remain agnostic about the
effects of amendment to abolish term limits, replacement seems to
be of greater concern. In part, this is because the welfare effects of
constitutional replacement may be negative.126 Replacing a constitu-
tion entails costly renegotiation along many dimensions and may
perpetuate broader instability.127 The fourth solution, in which an
executive remains without any legal basis, may undermine the very
idea of a constitutional order. In short, replacement and ignoring
the constitution will have systemic consequences, whereas the de-
parture of the executive will also leave the polity devoid of an
effective or popular leader.
Even the second solution, amendment, may be problematic,
though it adheres nominally to constitutional guidelines. Democracy
is ultimately about processes, not personalities,128 and there is some-
thing unseemly about rulers who reengineer higher law to facilitate
personal ambition. Of course, one may adopt a qualified approach
to amendments designed to evade term limits by focusing on the
process of evasion. John Carey distinguishes extensions of executive
term brought about by negotiations between the president and the
opposition from those brought about by plebiscite.129 In the former
case—which Carey associates with strategies chosen by Latin
125. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. The manner of the executive’s departure
may make a difference as well. For example, removal of the president through military
intervention may be deemed more damaging to the constitutional order than allowing the
executive to remain in place. 
126. ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 4, at 22.
127. Id. at 66-68.
128. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
129. Carey, supra note 59, at 88.
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American leaders Carlos Menem, Fernando Cardoso, and Alberto
Uribe130—the extension of term is accompanied by limits on power,
and so the risk of tyranny is mitigated.131 With referenda, subse-
quent constraints on the executive may be less effective.132 Another
alternative is informal amendment through supreme or constitu-
tional court interpretation, as in Nicaragua,133 Ukraine,134 and
Kyrgyzstan.135
In short, the normative debate over term limits turns on various
empirical and theoretical claims. Proponents fear executive tyranny,
and more generally the effects of incumbency on political competi-
tion.136 They also believe there to be positive benefits from encourag-
ing leaders to develop successors and political organizations that
can extend their policies into the future.137 Opponents argue that
term limits are antidemocratic and form an artificial restriction on
choice.138
Whatever benefits are associated with term limits, they seem to
be a relatively crude instrument because we have no reason to think
that the maximum legal term will always or even typically corre-
spond with the optimal term of office. That optimal period will be
determined by a whole array of exogenous factors, including the
extent of dynamic inconsistency problems, the international envir-
onment, and the level of incumbency advantage.139 Moreover, this
Article emphasizes that term limits, whatever their benefits, have
the distinct disadvantage of inducing constitutional crises for which
there exist few appealing solutions.140 The frequency of such crises
is explored in Part II. To be sure, there are many settings in which
term limits appear to function without inviting crisis, such as in the
130. Id. at 79.
131. Id. at 88.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
134. Seth Mydans, Ukraine President Was Right To Seek New Term, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
Dec. 31, 2003, at 3.
135. See Bruce Pannier, Commentary, Rethinking Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution, RADIO
FREE EUR., Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Rethinking_Kyrgyzstans_Tulip_
Revolution/1807335.html.
136. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
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United States and Mexico. One wonders whether these settings are
immune from crisis, or simply whether an executive that is young
enough and popular enough has not managed to tempt supporters
to challenge the law.141 
One implication of this analysis is that empirical inquiry may
inform the normative debate. We have, as yet, very little informa-
tion on the frequency with which term limits are adopted and
subsequently evaded. We also need a better sense of how often
crises arise historically and how they are typically resolved. The
next Part begins to provide some documentation of the frequency of
term limits and evasions.
II. EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS: THEIR TYPES AND INCIDENCE
We define an executive term limit as a constitutional restriction
on the number of fixed terms—consecutive or otherwise—the head
of state may serve. In this sense it is a species of qualification for
office, akin to age and other constitutional provisions that restrict
candidate entry and, thus, voters’ choice in some way. The focus in
this Article is exclusively on executives and not legislators, even
though some of the same issues arise with limits on either office.
Although most of the literature in the United States has focused on
legislative term limits,142 term limits on legislators are rare outside
of the United States.143 On the other hand, limits on the head of
state’s term are a characteristic of the majority of fixed-term
presidential systems of government and apply to both “real” and
figurehead heads of state.144
141. See KALT, supra note 114, at 151-58 (analyzing a hypothetical scenario in which a
president seeks to retain power by becoming vice president). Congressman José Serrano has
introduced a proposal in every Congress since the 105th to repeal the Twenty-Second
Amendment. See GovTrack.us, H.J. Res. 5, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=
hj111-5&tab=related (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). Senator Harry Reid introduced a similar
proposal in the Senate in 1989. See S. Res. 36, 101st Cong., 135 CONG. REC. 1302 (1989).
142. See, e.g., CAREY, supra note 74, at 3; DORON & HARRIS, supra note 50, at xxi;
LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES 1-2 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1996);
Polsby, supra note 84.
143. See CAREY, supra note 74, at 3.
144. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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As mentioned in Part I, the ancient Greeks developed the idea of
term limits to promote rotation in office.145 This principle also seems
to run through the architecture of the Roman republic, where
consuls served for only one year.146 Drafters at the beginning of the
modern constitutional era (the turn of the eighteenth century)
were informed by classical models of democracy and certainly saw
term limits as a viable option as well.147 The U.S. Founders engaged
in a vigorous debate on the subject, both during and after the
Philadelphia sessions, described briefly above, but allowed executive
reelection.148 Regardless, George Washington left office after two
terms and set a precedent that would be followed by the next thirty
Presidents, including some such as Jefferson and Jackson that could
easily have won a third term.149 
By at least the late nineteenth century, then, the two-term stay
was considered an unwritten constitutional norm in the United
States.150 When General Grant was considering running for a third
term, a popular outcry ensued with some taking Washington’s pre-
cedent as unwritten law.151 Incumbent President Grover Cleveland’s
own Democratic Party adopted a statement in its party platform in
1896 that there was such an unwritten law,152 no doubt to keep him
from running a third time. Theodore Roosevelt tested the scope and
limits of the norm, however, when he sought to run on his independ-
ent Bull Moose ticket in 1912, having already served a full term as
well as most of another when he succeeded from the Vice Presidency
145. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
146. See TITUS LIVIUS, THE HISTORY OF ROME, BOOKS I AND II, at 109 (D. Spillon trans.,
Philadelphia, David McKay 1896).
147. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 54-58, 86-90, 94-99 and accompanying text.
149. See JOHN E. FERLING, THE FIRST OF MEN: A LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 465 (1988);
FLEXNER, supra note 89, at 347; JAMES MORTON SMITH, GEORGE WASHINGTON: A PROFILE 245
(1969). Jefferson even hoped that his following Washington’s precedent might lead to a
constitutional amendment to prevent extensions of term. STEIN, supra note 32, at 36. Jackson,
for his part, proposed such an amendment limiting Presidents to one term. Id. at 56.
150. See, e.g., HERBERT W. HORWILL, THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 88-89
(1925); STEIN, supra note 32, at 62-63; CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51-53 (1890). John Quincy Adams may have been the first
to identify it as such. He called it a “tacit subsidiary constitutional law” in 1839. See STEIN,
supra note 32, at 62.
151. HORWILL, supra note 150, at 92.
152. Id. at 92-93.
2011] EVASION OF EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS 1835
after the death of James McKinley.153 While campaigning, Roosevelt
was shot by a man who justified his actions “as a warning that men
must not try to have more than two terms as President.”154 Roose-
velt was ultimately defeated and the issue lay dormant until his
cousin Franklin Delano Roosevelt ran for a third term in 1940.155
After Franklin Roosevelt’s death, the Republican party introduced
the Twenty-Second Amendment to formalize the informal rule, and
the Amendment was ratified in 1951.156 
Constitution makers in Latin America pointedly ignored the U.S.
lead and explicitly adopted term limits almost universally from the
start.157 Other regions around the world have followed. Executive
term limits have thus been a central democratic institution asso-
ciated with national constitutions from very early on. 
We may get a better sense of this history by consulting the data
on constitutions in the Comparative Constitutions Project.158 In that
project, we have collected the written constitutions for all independ-
ent countries since 1789 and recorded their characteristics across a
wide number of dimensions. Our current sample includes 619 con-
stitutional systems from the universe of 960 systems that we have
identified as existing in independent states, including microstates,
from 1789 to 2006. Overall, 269 of these constitutions, or 43 percent,
place some limit on the number of terms the head of state is eligible
to serve. However, if we consider only the 428 constitutional sys-
tems that provide the head of state with a fixed term in office—that
is, presidential and semi-presidential systems, which is a more
relevant sample for our purposes and the one used throughout the
153. Id. at 93.
154. Id. at 95. Roosevelt took the bullet in the chest but insisted on giving his speech, in
keeping with his “Bull Moose” reputation. Id.
155. STEIN, supra note 32, at 314.
156. See Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 65-
70 (1990). For an argument on the efficacy of the formal Amendment, see David A. Strauss,
The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1494-96 (2001). Some
have argued that the Amendment could easily be overcome if a term-limited President ran
for Vice President and succeeded to the office. See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The
Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment,
83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 633 (1999).
157. Carey, supra note 59, at 80-81 (describing early Latin American thinking on the
subject).
158. See Comparative Constitutions Project, supra note 27, for further details on data and
coding.
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remainder of this Article—the share of systems with executive term
limits is over 60 percent.159 Another 10 percent of fixed-term
constitutions explicitly state that there are no term limits, leaving
roughly 30 percent that are silent on the subject. For most of the
last group, we infer that there is no limit, although certainly some
such limits may be imposed by ordinary law or unwritten cus-
tom—for example, as many assert existed in the United States until
the passage of the Twenty-Second Amendment.160 
Executive term limits come in several varieties. Historically, the
most common species—27 percent of all fixed-term constitutions—
allows multiple terms, but not in succession, an approach that
institutionalizes some alternation in power.161 The U.S. model, in
which only two terms are permitted, is also found with some
frequency: 20 percent of cases.162 In addition, 8 percent of constitu-
tions combine these two models, so that two successive terms are
permitted, after which the candidate must sit out at least one term
before returning. Some Latin American constitutions have a pro-
hibition on consecutive terms combined with a specification of
the number of terms the executive must remain out of office. For
example, the constitutions of Ecuador (1830 and 1897),163 Panama
(1956 and 2004),164 Uruguay (1917),165 and Venezuela (1961)166
require two terms to elapse before the executive may be reelected.
159. We exclude parliamentary systems with figurehead heads of state, such as India.
Seventy-five percent of in-force presidential and semi-presidential constitutions have term
limits for the head of state. See infra fig.1.
160. In this sense our data may understate the true extent of actual term limits in
operation.
161. Some of these constitutions extend the succession limitation to the vice president to
prevent the president and vice president from alternately succeeding each other. See, e.g.,
CONST. ARG. § 90 (amended 1994).
162. A small number of constitutions allow three terms. See CONST. KIRIBATI § 32 (1995);
CONST. SEY. art. 52, § 2 (1993); see also CONST. DESIGN GROUP, TERM LENGTH AND TERM
LIMITS OF THE HEAD OF STATE 4 (2009), available at http://constitutionmaking.org/
files/term_limits.pdf (noting other constitutions that allow three terms, including the Republic
of Vietnam’s 1962 Constitution and Rwanda’s 1973 Constitution). Some of these allow a
subsequent term after a term out of power. The largest number of terms is found in the
Rwanda Constitution of 1962, CONST. RWANDA art. 53 (1962), which allowed four successive
terms.
163. CONST. ECUADOR art. 34 (1830); CONST. ECUADOR art. 89 (1897).
164. CONST. PAN. art. 158 (1956); CONST. PAN. art. 178 (2004).
165. CONST. URU. art. 73 (1917).
166. CONST. DESIGN GROUP, supra note 162, at 6.
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Limitations of the executive to a single term, such as the provision
at issue in Honduras’s constitutional crisis167 or Mexico’s sexenio, are
relatively rare.168 Historically, only eighteen constitutions—3 per-
cent of fixed-term constitutions—have included such a provision.169
More obscure variants exist. Some constitutions specify an excep-
tional provision for a particular person holding the executive post as
well as a more general provision to apply to subsequent officehold-
ers. For example, the French Constitution of 1852 specifies that
“[t]he government of the French Republic is confided for ten years
to Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, now President of the Repub-
lic.”170 The Constitution of Yugoslavia of 1963 specified a general
four-year term for a President but provided unlimited tenure for
Josip Broz-Tito,171 who served in that office until his death in
1980.172 This tendency toward personalization is not relegated to the
dustbins of history. As of September 2009, reports suggested that
leaders in Kazakhstan planned to introduce a law that would have
named longtime leader Nursultan Nazarbeyev as “President for
Life,” though he subsequently rejected it.173 A more reasonable
attempt to deal with a short-term political need was the Lebanese
constitutional amendment of 1995, which included a one-time,
three-year extension of the term of the sitting President.174
167. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
168. On Mexico, see ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 4, at 194.
169. CONST. DESIGN GROUP, supra note 162, at 2.
170. 1852 CONST. art. II (Fr.).
171. CONST. YUGO. art. 220 (1963).
172. Raymond H. Anderson, Giant Among Communists Governed Like a Monarch, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1980, at A1.
173. See Dana Rysmukhamedova, “Canada.com”: Kazakhstan To Consider “Lifelong
Presidency,” ZAMANDASH, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.eng.zpress.kg/news/news_only/5/2043.
174. See Elias Hrawi, 80, Ex-Chief of Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at B6. This turned
out to set a precedent, adopted by the successor President as well. See John Kifner, Pressed
by Syria, Lebanese Cabinet Agrees To Extend Leader’s Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at N3.
1838 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1807
Liberia’s 1847 Constitution, as amended in 1943,175 is a very
interesting case in which a second eight-year term is prohibited, but
a shortened second term is allowed: 
The Supreme Executive Power shall be vested in a President
who shall be elected by the people, and shall hold his office for a
term of eight years. No President may be elected for two
consecutive terms of eight years, but should a majority of the
ballots cast at a second or any other succeeding election by all of
the electors voting thereat elect him, his second or any other
succeeding term of office shall be for four years.176 
Figure 1 provides a historical sense of the distribution of execu-
tive term limits. The majority of fixed-term constitutions have
always had term limits. In the post-World War II era, however, we
observe a drop in their popularity, mostly due to an influx of non-
Latin American constitutions to the population. Since the third
wave of democratization, executive term limits have come back into
fashion and are now as popular as ever. Although term limits retain
great popularity, constitutions now provide executives with a more
generous period to govern than did early constitutions. Prior to
World War II, few countries with limits allowed their heads of state
to serve more than one consecutive term. Since World War II, most
countries with term limits have settled on two terms as the
appropriate threshold, with roughly half of those allowing a return
to office following a sitting-out period and the other half not
allowing any return.
175. The length of term and term limits in Liberia’s 1847 Constitution were heavily
amended throughout the years. The length of term was originally two years with no term
limits. See George W. Ellis, Political Institutions in Liberia, 5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 213, 214
(1911). This was extended to four years with no term limits in 1907, id., and extended to eight
years without the possibility of reelection in 1935, see MICHAEL G. KITAY, CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: LIBERIA 3 n.21 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
1982). This was changed to the final configuration in 1943 during William Tubman’s tenure
as President. See Luca Renda, Ending Civil Wars: The Case of Liberia, FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., Fall 1999, at 63.
176. CONST. LIBER. art. 3.1 (1943).
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Figure 1. Percent of Countries with Executive Term Limits,
by Type of Limit
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Not only is the number of permitted terms on the rise, but so too
is the length of terms. The most common term lengths for heads of
state are four, five, and six years-84 percent of constitutions
specify one of these term lengths."'a The prevalence of four-year
terms has been on the decline since the early 1900s. 79 In 1900, 60
percent of constitutions that had a specified term length for the
head of state provided for a four-year term.' By 2000, however,
that number had decreased to 18 percent.' This drop may be yet
177. By "permitted tenure" we mean the product of term length and the number of terms
allowed.
178. CONST. DESIGN GROUP, supra note 162, at 1-2.
179. See id. at 3 fig. 1.
180. Data on file with William and Mary Law Review.
181. Data on file with William and Mary Law Review.
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another indicator of the decline of popularity of the U.S. constitu-
tional model.182 The share of constitutions granting a five-year term,
on the other hand, has increased dramatically since the 1930s, from
almost none to about 60 percent of those constitutions with a
specified term.183
The combination of longer terms and an increase in the number
of permitted terms has considerably stretched the maximum time
heads of state are constitutionally allowed to hold office; indeed, the
average permitted tenure has doubled since 1875. As Figure 2
shows, the average maximum tenure for executives has increased
from just over four years in 1875 to nearly eight years in 2006. For
much of this time period, the observed tenure of executives has also
increased. Recent years, however, have witnessed a drop in actual
time served.
182. See ELKINS, GINSBURG & MELTON, supra note 4, at 26, for others.
183. Data on file with William and Mary Law Review.
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Figure 3. Percent of Countries with Executive Term Limits,
by Region
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There is an interesting regional pattern to these data, as Figure
3 shows. In Latin America, a region that has been universally
presidentialist since state formation,18 nearly all constitutions
through the turn of the twentieth century, and well over 90 percent
of constitutions through World War II, contained executive term
limits. In the postwar era, however, the proportion of countries in
Latin America with limits has dropped. Among constitutions
currently in force in Latin America, only 85 percent contain
executive term limits, down from 95 percent immediately after
World War II. On the other hand, constitutions in the rest of the
world have gone the other direction. Although only 47 percent of
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constitutions outside of Latin America provided for term limits in
1950, 73 percent now do. With respect to term limits at least, Latin
America is starting to look more like the rest of the world at the
same time the rest of the world is becoming more like Latin
America.
Upon closer inspection, the data also suggest distinctive regional
and temporal styles with respect to the type of limits. Although one-
term limits are relatively rare in the modern era, they are nearly all
found in Latin America, with most such cases allowing nonsuc-
cessive terms.185 In the post-Soviet and Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, on the other hand, two-term limits are more popular, and
whereas the post-Soviet countries are split on nonsuccessive terms,
the Sub-Saharan African countries tend to explicitly prohibit such
a return by the executive.186
Overall, the data suggest that term limits are an almost universal
and enduring part of presidential democracy. They are prominent
not only in Latin America—a region where their usage has eroded
in recent years—but also in other regions where presidentialism
and (especially) semi-presidentialism have become fashionable. It
does appear, however, that restrictions on executives have softened
over the years. Leaders are permitted to stay twice as long as they
used to be. Still, the cases cited at the outset of this Article sug-
gested that even these longer limits may not be enough to contain
executive ambition.187 We turn now to an analysis of these sorts of
evasions.
III. HOW OFTEN ARE TERM LIMITS HONORED?
A crucial question for the study of comparative constitutions is
under what conditions their provisions are observed. We know, of
course, that in many times and places, constitutions do not provide
any effective constraint on power holders, while in other instances
they seem to be effective.188 Term limit provisions provide one lens
185. Data on file with William and Mary Law Review.
186. Data on file with William and Mary Law Review.
187. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
188. See BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONALITY 103-04 (2009); NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NON-CONSTITUTIONAL
WORLD 3-7 (2002).
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through which to analyze this issue. Are term limits mere “parch-
ment barriers” to be set aside whenever an ambitious executive
wishes to stay in office?189 Or do they form real constraints that are
observed in practice? This Part tackles these questions. 
A. Understay, Punctual Exit, and Overstay
Conceptually, executives subject to a fixed term may (1) under-
stay, defined as leaving office early; (2) serve through their maxi-
mum tenure and leave punctually; or (3) overstay, defined as staying
longer than the maximum term as it stood when the candidate
originally came in office. The focus here is on the last two categories.
We may classify leaders into one of the three categories by compar-
ing de jure constitutional information on term limits with the period
of time that leaders actually served. De jure rules may be assessed
with data from written constitutions, combining information on both
the number and the length of terms that leaders are permitted.
These two elements combine to produce a measure of the maximum
allowed tenure. Figure 4 describes the distribution of this measure,
whose mean of roughly eight for this sample corresponds to the U.S.
model of two terms of four years. The modal value of ten, likewise,
corresponds to the increasingly popular formula of two terms of five
years. 
This measure is fairly easy to compare with the career of leaders
who served consecutive terms. Of course, any such comparison
depends upon good information on the tenure of world leaders, and
for that we employ a very useful set of data from the Archigos
Project,190 which, for leaders across the world since 1875, records the
date on which they took and left office and by what means they left.
The analysis of the two sets of data thus begins in 1875, even
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison), supra note 37, at 274 (asking rhetorically,
“[w]ill it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the
constitution of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the
encroaching spirit of power?” and stating that “[t]he conclusion which I am warranted in
drawing from these observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the
constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in
the same hands”).
190. See generally Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Giacomo Chiozza,
Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders, 46 J. PEACE RES. 269 (2009).
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though we have data on constitutional provisions dating to 1789.
The sample includes 644 heads of state subject to limits, of whom 45
percent (292 heads of state) understayed, 44 percent (281 heads of
state) served their maximum tenure and then stepped down, and 11
percent (71 heads of state) overstayed.
Figure 4. Maximum Tenure for Heads of State (Combines
Term Length and Term Limits)
Universe: Constitutional systems with fixed-term heads of state,
since 1789
CUc
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Maximum Tenure Allowed
For the purposes of this Article, we are primarily interested in the
executives who leave punctually or overstay, but because the
plurality of leaders understay, a brief look at this group seems
warranted. Leaders may leave early for a number of reasons. Table
2011] 1845
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1, which draws on the reasons for exit, sheds some light here.191
Most understayers—51 percent—are removed from office through
“regular means.” For the executives in this set, this means regularly
scheduled elections, although these elections may not be “free and
fair.” Another 12 percent either died of natural causes or retired
citing health reasons. Thus, over 60 percent of executives who did
not serve their maximum tenure left through “regular” means,
leaving the formal constitution intact.192 On the other hand, a
nontrivial number of understaying executives, 32.3 percent, were
forced from office by some extraconstitutional leadership change,
such as a military coup. The third row of Table 1 concerns those who
serve their maximum time in office and then leave punctually.
Roughly 90 percent of these executives leave office through “regular”
means. Thus, it appears that those who leave office early are
unlikely to leave through constitutionally prescribed procedures,
whereas those who leave “on time” do.
Some subset of those leaders who understay or leave on time
would likely have preferred to remain in office.193 Another subset
probably tried to remain in office, despite limits, but without suc-
cess.194 At this stage, we cannot precisely estimate the population in
these groups. Unrealized attempts to extend power do not reveal
themselves easily, at least in the large sample we consider here. We
can, however, say something about the degree and kind of overstays.
191. As coded by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, id. at 272-74; see infra tbl.1.
192. Some 4 percent of understaying executives are still in office. The fate of these
executives is undecided. They may turn out to be understayers. They may also serve their
maximum tenure or beyond.
193. See Posner & Young, supra note 11, at 133.
194. Indeed, Honduran President Zelaya “understayed” only because he failed in his
attempt to overstay. See J. Mark Ruhl, Honduras Unravels, J. DEMOCRACY, April 2010, at 93,
100-02; see also Posner & Young, supra note 11, at 133; infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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Table 1.  Punctuality and Mode of Exit
Universe: Fixed-term executives, since 1875





























































































































Overall, overstayers do not constitute a significant segment of the
population of leaders (11 percent). Yet, if we restrict the analysis to
those executives who actually had the opportunity to overstay—that
is, omitting understayers—the overstayers are a significant group.
This sort of restriction makes sense because an executive’s age,
popularity, and other factors restrict opportunities for overstay-
ing.195 So, of those leaders who served at least their maximum
tenure, more than 25 percent stayed longer than allowed. 
Overstayers managed this through various means. As we have
noted, sometimes the executive may engineer a constitutional
amendment196 or judicial interpretation197 to ensure continued ten-
195. See Posner & Young, supra note 11, at 135; supra notes 83, 193-94 and accompanying
text.
196. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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ure in office, either by extending the current term198 or by removing
prohibitions on reelection.199 If an amendment is unavailable, the
executive may formally suspend the constitution’s operation,200
perhaps through the use of emergency powers,201 or simply ignore
the constitution.202 In some cases, the executive may commission the
writing of a new constitution more amenable to longer terms.203
Such rewriting may extend the term of the executive, remove the
limit on the number of terms the executive is able to serve, or
simply reset the clock, so to speak, by reducing the number of full
terms the executive served under the in-force constitution. Thus,
overstay and understay may come in both constitutional and
extraconstitutional varieties. Some recent work suggests that extra-
constitutional modes of term limit transgression are becoming less
common.204
To examine this claim in more detail, we analyzed every instance
of potential executive overstay, meaning all leaders who stayed until
at least the expiration of their term. This more careful examination
resulted in a smaller number of overstays than observed in the
Archigos data. Out of 352 potential overstayers, 25.3 percent (89
leaders) attempted stay beyond their term.205 Of these, 79.8 percent
(71 leaders) were successful. This means that in 20.2 percent (71 of
198. See JONATHAN HARTLYN, THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC 39-41 (1998).
199. As noted above, the latter is exactly what occurred in Nicaragua in October 2009. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text. Our data cannot capture such reinterpretations of term
limits.
200. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
201. For example, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines. See
William H. Overholt, The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand Marcos, 26 ASIAN SURV. 1137, 1139-40
(1986). Mamadou Tandja of Niger also assumed sweeping emergency powers after the defeat
of a referendum that would have allowed him to seek reelection. See Emergency Powers for
Niger Leader, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8121974.stm; supra
note 3.
202. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
203. For example, Alberto Fujimori of Peru commissioned a new constitution that the
country approved by referendum. See Steven Levitsky, Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in
Peru, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1999, at 78. In the Philippines, Marcos replaced the constitution.
See Overholt, supra note 201.
204. Posner & Young, supra note 11, at 126-27.
205. The most common method of seeking an overstay was a constitutional amendment (40
cases), followed by constitutional replacement (29 cases). Constitutional suspension or coup
occurred in five cases, and in fifteen cases the constitution was simply disregarded or the
mechanism of overstay was unclear.
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352) of cases, term limits were not effective predictors of the actual
term served. The cases of unsuccessful attempts to overstay might
also be considered constitutional failures from an ideal of self-
enforcement,206 but from another perspective they reflect the
effective, albeit active, enforcement of the constitution.207 
Of the seventy-one cases in which executives successfully over-
stayed, twenty-nine involved constitutional amendment and hence
are relatively unproblematic from a normative point of view.208 In
another twenty-seven cases the constitution was replaced, and in
five cases the constitution was suspended or set aside. The remain-
ing ten cases indicate the constitution was simply disregarded or are
cases for which the mechanism of overstay is unclear, at least
according to the historical sources we consulted. Setting aside those
who overstayed through constitutional amendment, we may say
that roughly forty-two cases of overstay—11.9 percent of all
potential overstayers—resulted in a severe break to the constitu-
tional order, and another eighteen attempts to overstay were
unsuccessful. Whether this is considered a large or small number
depends on a view of the proverbial glass being half full or half
empty, but it is at least arguable that a figure of one in eight
represents a serious level of risk for the constitutional order, even
206. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
207. See BROWN, supra note 188, at 198; supra notes 116-41 and accompanying text. Our
data suggest that many of these are failed amendments. Attempts to overstay through
amendment succeed in 72.5 percent of attempts, whereas attempts through replacement and
suspension were successful in more than 95 percent of cases.
208. From an empirical standpoint, overstay through amendment also seems relatively
unproblematic. Executives who extend their maximum tenure through the amendment
process typically stay in office for only an extra four years—about one term. However,
executives who extend their maximum tenure through replacement or suspension of the
constitution typically stay in office for six or ten extra years, respectively. These numbers
would likely be even higher if such a large number of executives who overstay via replacement
or suspension were not removed through irregular means. See supra tbl.1. Of course, there
are exceptions to this general rule, like Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, who served as
President from 1987 to 2011 via an amendment in 2002 that abolished term limits in the
country. See Clement Henry, Tunisia’s “Sweet Little” Regime, in WORST OF THE WORST:
DEALING WITH REPRESSIVE AND ROGUE NATIONS 300, 301, 311 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2007);
Tunisia: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced Out, BBC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2011,
http://www.bbc/co/uk/news/world-africa-1295025. His total of nine extra years after amend-
ment was relatively long. But in general, those who extend their term limits through
constitutional amendment overstay fewer years than those who use other means. Moreover,
as discussed below, the consequences of overstay tend to be less severe when overstay is
achieved through amendment. See infra Part III.B.
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if we may celebrate the fact that the constitution “works” in the
other seven cases.
Even these numbers may overstate the incidence of punctual exit.
Sometimes an executive may leave on time yet violate the spirit of
term limits. Vladimir Putin’s amendments that created a more
powerful prime ministerial office, and thus provided a “golden para-
chute” for the ex-President, are one example.209 Another example is
Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, who cited the American practice
of limiting the presidency to two terms when in 1938 he stated that
he refused to run, despite what he interpreted to be the wishes of
his people.210 Trujillo proceeded to step down in favor of his Vice
President.211 But after President Roosevelt ran for a third term in
1942, Trujillo followed suit and reassumed the presidency for two
more terms, stepping down again in favor of his brother Hector in
1952.212 The analysis of evasions of term limits in this Article does
not fully capture these “false negative” instances of overstay.213 
B. Consequences of Overstay
Even if overstay through constitutional rupture occurs with some
frequency (one in eight cases), it does not follow that these actions
209. See Philip P. Pan, Russia Lengthens Presidential Tenures, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008,
at A12.
210. HARTLYN, supra note 198, at 43.
211. Id. at 43-45.
212. Id. Perhaps anticipating such manipulation, some Latin American constitutions forbid
relatives from succeeding the President. See Constitución Política de la República de
Nicaragua [Cn.] [Constitution] art. 147, La Gaceta [L.G.] 9 January 1987.
213. Another type of term evasion involves those who violate a limit on the number of
nonconsecutive terms. As noted in Figure 1, constitutions increasingly eliminate executives’
ability to serve nonconsecutive terms. With these new limits on executive tenure comes the
possibility that executives may run after intermediary terms, although they are
constitutionally barred from office. The only such evasion we were able to identify was by
Rafael Nunez of Colombia. Nunez was President from August 11, 1884, to April 1, 1886, and
despite a restriction in the 1863 Constitution that a full two-year term must elapse before a
President is eligible to serve again, he took office again on June 4, 1887. CONST. COLOM. of
1863, arts. 75, 79; 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 830 (15th ed. 2007); THE
STATESMAN’S YEAR-BOOK 607 (J. Scott Keltie ed., 1888). However, it is unclear whether this
is an overstay because Nunez’s two terms were served under two different constitutions.
William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory or
Popular Surrender?, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39, 49 (1991) (stating that a new
constitution was implemented in Colombia in 1886, before Nunez took office again). For the
sake of inclusiveness, we count it as one.
2011] EVASION OF EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS 1851
result in constitutional crisis, as opposed to something closer to a
consensual shift in constitutional norms. A more thorough investi-
gation of the consequences of term limit violations is required. The
remainder of this Part offers some suggestive evidence.
One way to get at the consequences of term limit evasion is to
trace particular case histories. The Appendix lists every violator of
term limits, sorted by whether the country was a democracy or
autocracy at the time the leader took office.214 Of the democratically
elected leaders who overstayed in recent years, several did so
through amendment and thus may fit the model of the popular
leader who works around the default rule to remain in office. Carlos
Menem in Argentina and Fernando Cardoso in Brazil revised their
constitutions to allow a second term,215 and both turned over the
office to opposition parties after their second terms were over,
though Menem tried to stay on before his attempt was ruled
unconstitutional.216 Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, on the other
hand, used amendment to consolidate power and moved his country
from the ranks of democracies to a “competitive authoritarian”
regime.217 Others who pursued this strategy either replaced the
constitution wholesale (Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Ferdinand Marcos
in the Philippines)218 or simply suspended it after failing to secure
amendment (Mamadou Tandja in Niger).219
The nineteenth century cases are also mixed. For example,
Costa Rica enacted a single four-year term limit with its 1871
Constitution.220 President Tomás Miguel Guardia Gutiérrez, who
214. See infra Appendix tbl.A1.
215. Carey, supra note 59, at 79.
216. Id. at 85; Larry Rohter, Departing President Leaves a Stable Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2002, at A10.
217. Andrei Sannikov, The Accidental Dictatorship of Alexander Lukashenko, 25 SAIS REV.
75, 76 (2005).
218. See ALBERT F. CELOZA, FERDINAND MARCOS AND THE PHILIPPINES 48 (1997); Jean
Grossholtz, Philippines 1973: Whither Marcos?, 14 ASIAN SURV. 102-03 (1974); Maria
McFarland Sánchez-Moreno, When a “Constitution” Is a Constitution: Focus on Peru, 33
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 561, 570 (2001).
219. Editorial, African Union Offering Too Little Too Late in Niger, OBSERVER, Mar. 3,
2010, http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7507&Itemid
=61.
220. Fabrice Lehoucq, Policymaking, Parties, and Institutions in Democratic Costa Rica 7
(Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, Working Paper No. 192, 2007), available at
http://www.cide.edu/publicaciones/status/dts/DTEP%20192.pdf.
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had been part of a coup ousting the previous President, overstayed
several months, then ceded power to a puppet leader briefly before
being reelected to continue his overstay until his own death.221 Term
limits were then observed for some time. In 1889, President Ramón
Bernardo Soto Alfaro attempted to overstay after holding the
purported first honest election in the country, but mass protests
prevented him from succeeding.222 The regime of his successor José
Joaqui Rodríguez marked a turning point for democracy.223
Thereafter, only one leader has overstayed (Rafael Yglesias Castro
in 1898) and has done so through constitutional amendment.224 The
Costa Rican story appears to be one in which attempted evasion led
to mass enforcement, ultimately leading to stable democracy.
Contrast the Costa Rican experience with that of Venezuela, the
country in the sample with the largest number of overstays—six.
Five of these occurred in the forty years prior to 1913,225 a period of
successive military strongmen who sometimes overstayed while
other times governed through puppet leaders that would leave office
on time.226 There was no effective enforcement of term limits, and
their application seemed to depend on the whim of the ruler.227 After
democracy was reestablished in 1959, term limits were regularly
observed.228 Hugo Chávez, however, initiated constitutional reform
after his initial election in 1999,229 and then in 2007 attempted to
amend the new constitution to remove term limits.230 His first
referendum attempt failed narrowly,231 but Chávez was able to hold
221. ROBERT L. SCHEINA, LATIN AMERICA’S WARS: THE AGE OF THE CAUDILLO, 1791-1899,
at 492 (2003).
222. See James L. Busey, The Presidents of Costa Rica, 18 AMERICAS 55, 67 (1961).
223. Id.
224. Castro attempted another constitutional amendment in 1902 to allow himself to
remain in power, but was defeated. See Carey, supra note 59, at 82.
225. See infra Appendix tbl.A2.
226. GlobalSecurity.org, Venezuela Introduction, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/venezuela/intro.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
227. See generally BRIAN LOVEMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF TYRANNY: REGIMES OF
EXCEPTION IN SPANISH AMERICA 156-60 (1993).
228. See THE UNRAVELING OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 11 (Jennifer L.
McCoy & David J. Myers eds., 2004).
229. Maxwell A. Cameron & Flavie Major, Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez: Savior or Threat to
Democracy?, 36 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 255, 256 (2001).
230. Juan Forero, Chavez Would Abolish Presidential Term Limit, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2007, at A21.
231. Chavez Defeated over Reform Vote, BBC NEWS, Dec. 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
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another referendum in 2009 that succeeded.232 By these actions, at
least, Chávez seems to represent a return to an earlier, less
constitutionalist tradition in Venezuela.
Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines exemplifies an executive
who suspended democracy to remain in office. The Philippines was
considered a democracy at the time of his initial election in 1965.233
The presidential term was four years, with a limit of eight consecu-
tive years in office.234 In 1969, Marcos won an unprecedented second
term,235 but thereafter became increasingly dictatorial and devel-
oped a cult of personality.236 In response to increasing insecurity
and a communist uprising, Marcos declared martial law in 1972,
suspending Congress.237 He then wrote a new constitution, which
allowed him to remain in power, and his dictatorship continued
until the “People Power” revolution of 1986.238 Since the reestablish-
ment of democracy, however, the Philippine political system has
weathered many attempts to engineer overstay, and has rebuffed
them all.239 Like Costa Rica, an incident of successful enforcement
seems to have facilitated a pattern of observance of term limits
thereafter.
C. Implications and Discussion
Our analysis also has a number of implications for the question
of whether and how constitutions “work.”240 From one perspective,
hi/7124313.stm.
232. Romero, supra note 6, at A1.
233. See Abrogating Democracy: The Military and the Fragile Democracy of the Philippines
(R.J. May & Viberto Selochan eds., 2004), http://epress.anu.edu.au/mdap/mobile_devices/
ch04s04.html.
234. CONST. (1946), Art. VII, § 5 (Phil.).
235. Richard J. Kessler, Marcos and the Americans, 63 FOREIGN POL’Y 40, 46 (1986).
236. STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 297 (Cecilio D. Duka ed., 2008); Anjan Ghosh, People’s Power
in the Philipines, 21 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1609, 1609 (1986).
237. SARA STEINMETZ, DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 144 (1994).
238. Kurt Schock, People Power and Political Opportunities: Social Movement Mobilization
and Outcomes in the Philippines and Burma, 46 SOC. PROBS. 355, 355 (1999).
239. See Aurel Croissant, From Transition to Defective Democracy: Mapping Asian
Democratization, 11 DEMOCRATIZATION 156, 161-62 (2004).
240. Other commentators have also opined on this question. See generally BRESLIN, supra
note 188, at 8, 13 (discussing how constitutions work and what factors are important in their
functionality).
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term limits seem to be observed with remarkable frequency, though
it is not clear what a baseline level of enforcement of such provisions
ought to be.241 The results suggest that the function of term limits
differs across regime type, and that broadly speaking, they tend to
function better in democracies than dictatorships. We do not have
a clear view of the mechanism by which term limits function in
democracies: they may operate through selection of better agents,
through the prospect of enforcement by elites or the people, or
through some other mechanism.242 Nevertheless, the effect is strong
enough to suggest that constitutional provisions seem to be observed
more frequently in democracies than in dictatorships. In democra-
cies, the gap between a term-limit provision and its practice is
decidedly narrower.
Examining each leader who has violated the term limit provisions
reveals only fifteen violations by leaders who took office in a
democratic regime (out of 160 leaders), with the remaining fifty-six
violations occurring in nondemocracies (out of 192 leaders).243 One
unanswered question, then, is why leaders in autocracies adopt
term limits in the first place. Although at the margin term limits
may provide some constraint,244 in many cases they provide none.245
Furthermore, the examples of Putin and Trujillo demonstrate that
even apparently effective term limits may be illusory.246 To specu-
late, the answer may have something to do with the achievement of
internal coordination within the regime—a term limit may signal to
potential rivals that they may have a chance to replace the leader
down the road.247 In this sense, the prevalence of term limits among
241. See supra notes 40-42, 105-10, 139-41 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., supra notes 28, 222, 238 and accompanying text.
243. See infra Appendix tbls.A1 & A2. Our measure of democracies is those countries with
a “Polity Score” of 3 or greater. See POLITY IV PROJECT, POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
AND TRANSITIONS, 1800-2009 (2010), http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
(explaining the Polity Score and typical score ranges). This is a relatively low threshold
compared to the one traditionally used in the literature, see id., because we wanted to ensure
that new and marginal democracies are included in the sample.
244. See ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE JUNTA,
AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 16-17 (2002).
245. See Quan Li, Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment,
42 COMP. POL. STUD. 1098, 1105-06 (2009) (discussing the ineffectiveness of institutional
constraints on autocrats).
246. See supra notes 12, 209-13 and accompanying text.
247. BARROS, supra note 244, at 19-20 (positing that institutional limits represent the
2011] EVASION OF EXECUTIVE TERM LIMITS 1855
authoritarians may reflect a larger pattern: constitutions—we and
others find—tend to be highly democratic, regardless of the use or
misuse of the documents by those who govern with them.248 But this
question requires further microstudy of authoritarian consti-
tutionalism.
Even if term limit evasions are sometimes associated with consti-
tutional crises of a negative sort, it is necessary to disaggregate
democracies and autocracies from a normative perspective. A
“crisis”249 in a dictatorship may lead to democratization and hence
be desirable from a normative point of view. For democracies, the
reverse presumption holds. We therefore cannot posit a global
recommendation for both regime types. 
Despite these limitations of the present analysis, those who are
skeptical about term limits may point to the Zelaya and Tandja
cases to argue that term limits are associated with some risk of
constitutional rupture.250 From a constitutional design perspective,
then, we ought to consider institutional alternatives to term limits.
The normative question about whether term limits ought to be
adopted will depend on the existence of alternative institutional
schemes that may accomplish the same goals without some of the
costs. The next Part considers a number of such schemes.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES
Term limits are designed to address real problems with demo-
cratic governance, namely the incumbency advantage, which dis-
torts political choice and may hamper optimal selection of represen-
tatives.251 In the absence of term limits, we may have
underperforming representatives that stay too long, and so we
decide ex ante to precommit to selecting a new agent.252 But term
limits are a blunt instrument to address the incumbency ad-
“subordination of present power to rules,” which constrains the range of choices that can be
made by current political actors).
248. See generally Zachary Elkins, Diffusion and the Constitutionalization of Europe, 43
COMP. POL. STUD. 969 (2010).
249. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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vantage.253 Not only is the maximum legal length of a limited term
unlikely to correspond to a hypothetical optimal term for an
executive,254 but this mismatch may induce popular executives to try
to adjust the constitution to stay in power. If opposition is signifi-
cant, the resulting crisis may lead to the death of the constitution
and even a descent into tyranny. This Part considers several
alternatives that may accomplish some of the desirable goals of term
limits without entailing all the costs. These include mechanisms to
adjust term length, alter the powers of the presidency through
“unbundling,” handicap the incumbent, and incentivize the chal-
lenger.
A. Adjusting Term Length
We briefly mentioned the Liberian model of 1943, which featured
a halving of the term length after the first two terms.255 This
reduction in term length may provide for greater accountability of
the incumbent, and in party-based systems may incentivize the
political party to cultivate successors to the current leader. A ra-
tional political party would rather retain office with a new candidate
for a longer term, as opposed to retaining office with the incumbent
for a shorter period.256
Adjusting term length may serve to address the concern with
executive tyranny that motivates some critics of term limits. More
frequent elections would allow the public to continuously scrutinize
executive performance, enhancing accountability. However, this
proposal would not directly address the incumbency advantage.
There is nothing inherent in more-frequent elections that would
reduce undue advantages an incumbent holds in electoral competi-
tion.257 Indeed, it may give added legitimacy to an incumbent who
frequently faces the voters.
253. See supra notes 116-41 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
256. Assuming that a political party seeks to maximize the time its representatives are in
office, in the case of decreasing term lengths, a rational party will prefer a new representative
in office for a longer period over an incumbent for less time. The counterargument is that the
incumbency advantage means that a political party may favor a candidate who is more likely
to be reelected over a new candidate.
257. See supra notes 59-64, 103-04 and accompanying text.
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A related substitute for term limits would be to promote the
institution of recall.258 A president subject to potential recall from
voters is somewhat akin to a prime minister in a parliamentary
system, in that every period of governance is potentially her last.259
Recall provisions are not popular in presidential democracies, for
they undermine the advantages of having a fixed term in the first
place, namely the insulation to pursue policies that are valuable in
the midterm.260 A feasible hybrid would be to have recall available
in later terms only; thus, the system would have features of a
presidential system during the first term and of a parliamentary
system in subsequent terms. We know of no system that has tried
it, but it seems like a feasible option.
There is, of course, no reason that candidates to office need to
stand for symmetrical terms. We might think about term length as
a variable that candidates could themselves manipulate within
constraints. Suppose, for example, that candidates for a second term
to the U.S. presidency could choose to run for (1) a single term of
four years or (2) a three-year term with the possibility of a final
third term. Again, this idea seems to incorporate into a presidential
system some of the irregular rhythm of elections in a parliamentary
system. There would be some coordination costs in aligning terms
of the House of Representatives with the presidency.261 But there is
nothing sacred about the four-year rhythm of the presidential
cycle,262 and creative institutional design may exploit variation in
term as a device to accomplish some of the ends of term limits. 
258. See California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, FAQs About Recalls, http://www.
sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_recall_faqs.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (describing a recall).
259. See Albert, supra note 33, at 561.
260. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
261. See 147 CONG. REC. 26,905 (2001) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (outlining the costs of a
program to improve federal elections).
262. Although the four-year length may not be sacred, in general, a term limit itself may
be. For example, the delegates at the Constitutional Convention mostly agreed that the
Constitution should limit the executive’s terms. See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., PRESIDENTIAL TERMS AND TENURE: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 1-2
(2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40864.pdf.
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B. Altering Powers
Another alternative to term limits may be to reduce formal
executive powers as the tenure of the officeholder goes on. This
could take two forms: unbundling powers and raising constraints.
Either of these options involves weakening of the executive, and
hence reduces the incentives to remain in office after the term ends.
Unbundling refers to the possibility of breaking up executive
functions typically concentrated in a single office.263 This may
involve the adoption of plural executives, such as found in many
U.S. states with directly elected attorneys general, lieutenant
governors, and other officials.264 In this context, unbundling may be
thought of as shorthand for the idea that the formal powers of the
executive may be reduced as the number of terms increases. Such
powers may be transferred to another executive—for example, to the
prime minister in a semi-presidential system—or to another branch
of government entirely.265 Raising constraints refers to the idea that
one may calibrate constraints on executive decision making by
empowering other actors, such as legislatures.
To illustrate, imagine a presidency with the constitutional powers
to appoint officers, to issue executive decrees, and to veto legislation,
subject to override by two-thirds of the legislature. An unbundling
strategy might take the power to issue decrees and transfer it to
another executive, say the vice president or a member of the legis-
lature. Raising constraints would make override of the executive
veto easier, by reducing the vote threshold to 60 percent, for ex-
ample.
Many term limit adjustments may already proceed under some
version of this proposal. As mentioned earlier, John Carey notes
several cases in which an extension of executive term was secured
263. See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1385 (2008); Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 303-04 (2010).
264. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 & n.3 (2006)
(explaining that attorneys general serve at the Governor’s behest in only two states, Alaska
and Wyoming, and that in forty-three states, voters independently elect the attorneys
general).
265. See Matthew S. Shugart, Of Presidents and Parliaments, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 30,
30-31 (1993) (providing examples of countries with presidential and parliamentary regimes).
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through negotiation with Congress.266 For example, Carlos Menem
in Argentina was able to secure an extension for a third term in
exchange for policy concessions to Congress,267 but the Supreme 
Court did not permit him to take office for a third term.268 In cases
such as this one, the negotiation may involve new implicit or explicit
limitations on the institutional power of the presidency, in which
case de facto unbundling may have taken place.
Altering powers has several advantages. By reducing formal
power over time, it has the effect of mitigating the concern for
tyranny that motivates term limits in the first place.269 Reducing
powers also serves to disincentivize incumbent candidates from run-
ning for office. Indeed, a strong political party may insist that the
incumbent leave office on time to facilitate another candidate who
may win and acquire the full range of executive powers.270 By re-
ducing the stakes of the presidency, adjusting powers may facilitate
on-time departure and build stronger parties.
To be sure, shedding powers is no panacea. It may introduce a
new veto player over key policies and so encourage delay and
gridlock.271 And in any case, a formal reduction in powers may not
offset the tremendous informal powers that long-serving executives
have.272 These may more than compensate for the lack of formal
authority. One may also imagine that an executive would seek to
reacquire the lost powers through constitutional amendment after
gaining office.273
C. Handicapping Incumbents 
Beyond manipulating the design dimensions of term length and
constitutional powers, we may consider calibrating the electoral
266. Carey, supra note 59, at 88.
267. See id. at 85.
268. Id. at 85-86.
269. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
271. Cf. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 45-
47 (Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (1840) (debating the form of the executive and the relationship
between executive form and executive power).
272. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
273. Cf. supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text (listing executives who have used
constitutional amendments to remain in power).
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process more directly. One common mechanism appears in many
Latin American countries, in which an incumbent seeking reelection
must refrain from using state resources during the period of the
electoral campaign.274 This device prevents the incumbent from
using the advantages of office to maintain power. To be sure, a well-
known incumbent may still have advantages due to cognitive biases
and media familiarity.275 But this modest step does serve to hand-
icap incumbents somewhat, and may do little harm.276 We are aware
of no literature evaluating the institution.277 
A version of this handicap is the notion of caretaker govern-
ments.278 In some parliamentary systems, a new caretaker govern-
ment is installed when the government loses a vote of no confi-
dence.279 For example, in Bangladesh, the caretaker government is
an advisory council headed by a former Chief Justice that governs
prior to a new election.280 This device is designed to prevent self-
dealing by a more conventionally political caretaker government.
274. See, e.g., CONST. COLOM. art. 127 (prohibiting use of state property by an incumbent
President).
275. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
276. But see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 71, 72 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the
ineffectiveness of an executive with too short a term).
277. Another approach would focus not so much on the incumbent, but on incentivizing
challengers through leveling the playing field to overcome the excessive advantages of
incumbency. Consider, for example, a situation in which elections involve public financing.
We might provide more public funds to challengers than to incumbents to overcome the
advantage of the incumbent. The Vermont campaign finance restrictions struck down in
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 238-39 (2006), imposed lower expenditure limits on
incumbents than on challengers, though this was not a dispositive issue in the case. We might
also insist on more media time for the challenger than for the incumbent to offset greater
public information on the latter. But see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006) (requiring broadcasters
to provide equal time to political candidates). Such overcompensation would be particularly
helpful in reducing the barriers to entry associated with incumbency. Of course, there are
technical issues of valuation that would not be easy to overcome, but this mechanism holds
the greatest promise for overcoming the incumbency advantage. Monetizing the incumbency
advantage would surely help to overcome it.
278. See Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman & Ian Budge, Party Government in 20
Democracies: An Update (1990-1995), 33 EUR. J. POL. RES. 125, 128 (1998) (defining caretaker
government).
279. See, e.g., Christopher Emsden, Government of Romania Falls in Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct.
14, 2009, at A17 (reporting on the installation of a caretaker government following a vote of
no confidence).
280. See Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of Good Governance
Court, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 66 (2009).
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How else might we deal with the incumbency advantage?
Consider, as a thought experiment, an alternative mechanism to
deal with problems of incumbency: raising the vote thresholds for
incumbents, with increasing tenure triggering higher thresholds.
Suppose, for example, that a first presidential term required a
plurality of votes, a second term an absolute majority, a third term
a majority of 55 percent, and so on. In theory, one could calibrate
the increasing supermajority required to maintain an incumbent to
mitigate the problem of barriers to entry and other incumbency
advantages.281 
In a very different context, Bruce Ackerman draws on the South
African constitutional provisions on emergencies to propose a
“supermajoritarian escalator” in which gradually increasing legis-
lative supermajorities are required to approve the state of emer-
gency over time.282 This proposal has been subjected to criticism in
the context of emergency powers, in part because it does not
anticipate the incentives of legislators, and also because Ackerman
rather oddly proposes that it be based in statute.283 The device may
make more sense in the context of constitutional provisions regu-
lating potential executive overstay. The proposal for a vote thresh-
old that increases with the number of terms has not, to our knowl-
edge, been made before, though it has some precedent in other
constitutional domains.284 Here we develop the idea briefly, con-
sidering some practical issues and potential objections. 
A first issue is technical and centers around the problem of
elections in which an incumbent needs a supermajority but does not
obtain it. There would be several possible ways to run the elections
281. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
282. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE
OF TERRORISM 4, 80 (2006). 
283. See Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 641-49 (2006). 
284. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 37(2) (“A declaration of a state of emergency, and any
legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of that declaration, may be effective
only (a) prospectively; and (b) for no more than 21 days from the date of the declaration,
unless the National Assembly resolves to extend the declaration. The Assembly may extend
a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. The first
extension of the state of emergency must be by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote
of a majority of the members of the Assembly. Any subsequent extension must be by a
resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members of the
Assembly.”).
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under consideration, most of which center around two-round pro-
cesses.285 Two-round systems are widely used in democracies that
require an absolute majority of support for the presidency.286 One
alternative is that the initial vote is simply a retention election for
the incumbent, something like the 1988 plebiscite on Augusto
Pinochet’s continuance in Chile.287 If the incumbent fails to obtain
the required supermajority, a second vote would be held under the
ordinary rules, with the incumbent excluded. This idea has the
advantage of pooling all opposition votes into a single negative vote
on the incumbent, though it does raise the potential costs of the
election in that it may require three rounds of voting to produce a
candidate with an absolute majority.
To be sure, some voters’ preference orderings may be to condition-
ally prefer the incumbent. To illustrate, imagine a situation in
which there are three parties, arrayed left-center-right. The center
is the incumbent. The right voter would prefer the incumbent to a
left candidate, but prefers the right to either alternative. In an
initial round of voting, the voter must decide to vote yes or no on the
incumbent, and in doing so will have to engage in strategic calcula-
tions about what will happen in the second round. In some circum-
stances, the incumbent may win even though she has the absolute
support of a minority. But this is not an objection to the scheme.
Such strategic calculations are common to two-round systems,288
and there is nothing unique about the fact that the candidate in
question is an otherwise term-limited incumbent.
A second possibility is to hold a contested first round. Should the
incumbent win a majority, or plurality if that is the applicable rule,
but fail to secure the required supermajority, there would be a
second round of voting with the incumbent excluded. Alternatively,
the office could go to a deputy executive as matter of course. This
would lead to a strategic calculus on the part of the executive about
whether to try for a supermajority or simply let the deputy run as
285. See José Antonio Cheibub, Making Presidential and Semi-presidential Constitutions
Work, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1375, 1384-85 (2009) (explaining the two-round process).
286. Id.
287. See Shirley Christian, Plebiscite in Chile, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, at A1.
288. See Carles Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in
Advanced Democracies, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 609, 612-13 (1999) (providing an example of
strategic calculation in a two-round system).
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a successor under ordinary rules. Incumbency advantages would
likely induce the executive to run.289
One major problem with this alternative is that it may not
effectively reduce the propensity of constitutional crises. Certainly,
one could imagine the awkward situation in which an incumbent
achieves a majority of the vote but not a supermajority. Will his
supporters accept the outcome that a candidate who received fewer
votes would take office? Perhaps not, and the result might be the
same type of crisis produced by a majority whose will is frustrated
by term limits.290
A second issue is how to set the vote thresholds. Pure majority
rule, though contested on normative grounds in some quarters,291
has enough value as a focal point to need little elaboration.292 What,
however, should be the threshold for executives that are running for
a second or third term? Because we believe that the incumbency
advantage, and its deleterious effects on political competition, form
the most persuasive rationale for term limits,293 we focus on that
issue. The threshold might be set based on a local or global study of
the incumbency advantage.294 Alternatively, one might develop
experimental evidence to try to estimate the advantage. In any case,
the remedy is simple. If the incumbency advantage is determined to
be 5 percent, then the supermajority requirement for retention
might be 55 percent. We also believe that the threshold should rise
with additional terms, though there ought to be an upper threshold
for the “supermajoritarian escalator.”
289. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
290. A mediate alternative would be to provide that term limits would be triggered for
candidates who failed to obtain the supermajority but still got 50 percent of the vote. For
example, an incumbent who failed to reach a threshold would still be allowed to take office,
but not run again. Term limits in this scheme are conditional on earning majority but not
supermajority support. It might be preferable to employ some other method of handicapping
incumbents that makes adjustments at an earlier stage in the voting process. For example,
one might alter the ballot by ruling incumbents eligible only as write-in candidates. See
Elhauge, supra note 63, at 166.
291. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 145 (1962)
(critiquing majority rule).
292. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37, at 120 (“[The]
fundamental maxim of republican government ... requires that the sense of the majority
should prevail.”).
293. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 115, at 1142-43.
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A third issue is that our proposal assumes that the executive is
unable to manipulate the actual voting process. If an executive can
freely engage in ballot box stuffing and other forms of electoral
fraud, the level of supermajority required will not affect her ability
to retain office: the executive will simply steal enough votes to win.
Although these risks are very real, they do not form a special
objection to supermajority requirements. Elections may be stolen
with or without term limits, regardless of the voting threshold.
D. Incentivizing Retirement
If one cannot effectively handicap incumbents, one could consider
the inverse: incentivizing incumbents to leave office. Providing for
some ex officio constitutional power for ex-presidents may induce
them to step down. Consider France, which makes all living ex-
Presidents ex officio members of the constitutional court, the
Conseil Constitutionnel.295 Alternatively, international actors may
induce presidents to step down. For example, Ernesto Zedillo, a non-
overstaying former President of Mexico, is a professor at Yale
University.296 African entrepreneur Mo Ibrahim offers an annual
prize for an African head of state who steps down, leaving a legacy
of good governance, though he has had some difficulty finding a
recipient in recent years.297
This approach to institutional design is orthogonal to term limits,
in that the two mechanisms may be adopted separately or in
conjunction. Its utility will depend on the sweetness of the induce-
ments relative to the potential gains of remaining in office. When
the potential gains of remaining in office are high—such as in
nondemocracies with resource-rich economies—no level of public
295. 1958 CONST. art. 56 (Fr.).
296. Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Ernesto Zedillo Biography, http://www.
ycsg.yale.edu/center/zedillo.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
297. The prize is $5 million plus an annuity of $200,000 for life. See Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, The Ibrahim Prize, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-
prize (last visited Mar. 14, 2011); Prize Offered to Africa’s Leaders, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6086088.stm. Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique received
the prize in 2007, and Festus Mogae of Botswana received it in 2008. See Mo Ibrahim
Foundation, The Ibrahim Prize Laureates, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/
the-ibrahim-prize/prize-laureates (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). The Foundation did not make
an award in 2009 or 2010. Id.
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sector inducement to leave office is likely to be sufficient. Perhaps
this explains why the well-intentioned Ibrahim prize has occa-
sionally gone unclaimed.
A related concern is the risk of stepping down. Replacement
leaders need to be able to credibly commit to not extorting the
wealth and other benefits accrued by former leaders. This is an
issue that has caused some concern about the International
Criminal Court, for example.298 Ensuring that retiring leaders have
immunity, asylum possibilities, and other such security guarantees
should help to induce them to leave office after successful overstay.
This suggests that the approach Peru has taken with regard to
Alberto Fujimori—extraditing him from Japan and Chile—is pre-
cisely wrong.299 A subsequent overstayer in Peru will be less likely
to step down, though arguably less likely to overstay in the first
place.300
E. Summary
Each of these four approaches—adjusting term length, powers,
handicapping incumbents, and incentivizing retirement—offers
some promise for addressing problems associated with executive
overstay. Each may operate in conjunction with or as an alternative
to term limits, serving as either complements or substitutes to
accomplish the same goals. Yet none is an unambiguously better
alternative. If term limits raise problems of calibration,301 so do each
of the alternatives. With term limits, calibration issues arise
because we never know ex ante what the optimal term length might
be.302 The identical issues arise in any scheme to adjust the term
298. See Tom Ginsburg, The Clash of Commitments at the International Criminal Court,
9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 499, 507-09 (2009); see also Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International
Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777,
807 (2006) (discussing security threats).
299. See Simon Romero, Chile Returns Fujimori to Peru To Face Rights Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at A20.
300. This problem has not yet manifested itself as the subsequent President did not
overstay. See Juan Forero, Failure in ‘90, Ex-President Wins in Peru in a Comeback, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2006, at A13 (reporting on the election of Alan Garcia following the expiration
of President Alejandro Toledo’s full term).
301. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 71, 72 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 37 (discussing the
benefits and drawbacks of term lengths and reeligibility restrictions).
302. Id.; see also supra notes 40-42.
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length of the incumbent. Shedding powers also raises calibration
issues, as we do not know what configuration of powers is sufficient
to properly motivate the incumbent. Handicapping or incentivizing
incumbents also raises questions of monetization of the incumbency
advantage and of sufficient inducements to retire. In short, although
each institutional alternative has promise, none provides an
obviously superior alternative. 
CONCLUSION
Term limits are designed to discourage tyranny and to address
real problems of incumbency in democratic governance, but they
have been subject to competing claims by proponents and oppo-
nents. Some, such as Simón Bolívar, have argued that term limits
are necessary to curb executive ambition. Others, including
Alexander Hamilton and other American Founders, have argued
that term limits would induce executives to seek to remain in office,
and perhaps even generate crises to allow themselves to do so. The
theoretical debate has proceeded without the benefit of much
empirical analysis. One of the objectives of this Article has been to
inform the normative debate with data on the frequency of overstay,
and to consider some alternative institutions that may accomplish
some of the ends of term limits without the costs of constitutional
crises.
Our evidence is not definitive, but on balance suggests that, for
democracies at least, constitutional crises induced through term
limit violations are relatively rare. Constitutional enforcement of
term limits appears to operate routinely in democracies, and even
in many autocracies, such as Mexico before 1994. Term limits seem
to “work” in the vast majority of cases, in that those who have the
possibility of overstaying do not frequently seek to do so. Of those
who do seek to overstay, 20 percent fail in the attempt, which may
also be considered a constitutional enforcement of sorts, even if it
sometimes coincides with a constitutional crisis. 
Even when term limits are violated, the consequences are not
always negative. Our evidence suggests that, on average, overstay
does not lead to the denigration of democracy. Of the recent over-
stayers in democracies, some, such as Menem and Cardoso, fit the
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profile of popular leaders who were able to amend around the
default rule to serve a single extra term. Only a small number of
leaders in recent years—Fujimori in Peru, Marcos in the Philip-
pines, and Chávez in Venezuela—have completely replaced the
constitution to allow themselves extra time. Some leaders, such as
Niger’s Mamadou Tandja, have subsequently found themselves
replaced through military coup. 
The finding that term limits operate as default rules whose
amendment need not always lead to future disruption has implica-
tions for the study of executive-legislative relations. One of the
canonical distinctions between presidential and parliamentary
systems is that the executive in the former is subject to a fixed term,
whereas the executive in the latter is subject to parliamentary
confidence and hence is not constrained by a fixed term.303 Yet if
executives in presidential systems frequently overstayed or under-
stayed their terms, we might think of presidential systems as de
jure rigid, but in practice flexible in the number of years an
executive serves. This would highlight Professor Albert’s recent
argument that the two canonical regime types may not, in fact, be
so different in actual operation.304
Our consideration of institutional alternatives to term limits
includes several new ideas not yet identified in the literature,
including adjusting term length for incumbents only, reducing the
powers of executive office with successive terms, and manipulating
the incentives of incumbents to remain in office. Each of these
alternatives, however, has costs. Furthermore, each alternative
relies on the possibility of calibrating a more complex institutional
design to mitigate incumbency advantages. The challenges to such
calibration are quite real.
This suggests that the very simplicity of term limits—an idea
easily comprehensible by the average citizen—may have something
to do with their effectiveness. Simple and clear rules, it seems, may
facilitate effective constitutional enforcement.305 Constitutional text
303. Cf. Albert, supra note 33, at 548-49; Cheibub et al., supra note 35; supra notes 33-39
and accompanying text.
304. Albert, supra note 33, at 531.
305. Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM 100, 115-16 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989); Peter C.
Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 CONST. POL. ECON. 137, 151 (1992); Barry R. Weingast,
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provides a focal point for enforcement behavior, and such enforce-
ment is likely to be easier when everyone understands the rules.
Although drawing a line of four or eight years as a maximum term
in office has elements of arbitrariness, the very clarity of a bright-
line rule ensures that the line will, more often than not, be ob-
served. In contrast with Alexander Hamilton’s conjecture, term
limits restrain rather than promote conflict.306 In the matter of con-
straining executive ambition, then, most constitutions seem to work
most of the time.307 
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 245-
46 (1997).
306. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
307. Cf. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (1979) (“[A]lmost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.”).
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APPENDIX
Table A1.  List of Democratic Overstayers (Democracy = Polity3)308










Argentina 1988 Menem Amendment 1995 8 5
Belarus
(Byelorussia)
1994 Lukashenko Amendment 2006 7 3
Brazil 1995 Cardoso Amendment 1998 8 10
Colombia 1884 Nunez Replacement 1886 8 17
Colombia 2002 Uribe Velez Amendment 2006 7 45
Costa Rica 1870 Guardia Disregarded/
Not Specified
1876 5 29





Costa Rica 1894 Yglesias
Castro
Amendment 1898 10 4
Honduras 1933 Carias
Andino
Replacement 1936 5 7
Namibia 1990 Nujoma Amendment 2000 6 0




Peru 1990 Fujimori Replacement 1995 8 10
Philippines 1965 Marcos Replacement 1973 5 15
Uruguay 1931 Terra Replacement 1935 3 27
Venezuela 1999 Chávez Replacement 2004 7 30
308. See supra note 243 for a description of the Polity Score.
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Table A2.  List of Autocratic Overstayers (Autocracy = Polity<3)309










Algeria 1999 Bouteflika Amendment 2009 -3 4
Angola 1979 Dos Santos Disregarded/
Not Specified
2007 -7 4
Argentina 1946 Peron Amendment 1952 -8 0
Bolivia 1920 Saavedra De Facto Control 1924 2 40
Bolivia 1971 Banzer Suarez Disregarded/
Not Specified
1975 -7 0
Brazil 1930 Vargas Replacement 1938 -4 0
Chad 1990 Deby Amendment 2006 -7 4
Chile 1973 Pinochet Replacement 1980 -7 0




1965 Mobutu Replacement 1969 -9 0
Ecuador 1895 Eloy Alfaro
Delgado
Replacement 1896 -1 65






El Salvador 1871 Gonzalez Replacement 1873 -1 12
El Salvador 1876 Zaldivar Replacement 1880 -1 17
El Salvador 1935 Hernandez
Martinez
Replacement 1939 -9 4
Eritrea 1993 Afeworki Disregarded/
Not Specified
2007 -6 0
Gabon 1967 Bongo Amendment 2003 -7 7
Guatemala 1885 Barillas Amendment 1889 2 6
Guatemala 1898 Estrada-Cabrera Disregarded/
Not Specified
1903 2 0
Guatemala 1931 Ubico y
Castañeda
Amendment 1934 -9 0
Guinea 1984 Conte Amendment 2001 -7 26
Haiti 1957 Duvalier,
Francois
Replacement 1962 -5 7
Honduras 1963 Lopez Arellano Replacement 1968 -1 27
309. See supra note 243 for a description of the Polity Score.
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Kazakhstan 1991 Nazarbaev Amendment 2005 -3 0
Lebanon 1943 El Khoury Amendment 1948 2 0
Lebanon 1989 Elias Hrawi Amendment 1995 0 0
Lebanon 1998 Emile Lahoud Amendment 2004 0
Liberia 1944 Tubman Amendment 1951 -6 60
Lithuania 1926 Smetona Replacement 1932 0 0
Mali 1968 Traore Amendment 1987 -7 8
Nicaragua 1893 Zelaya Amendment 1896 -5 55
Nicaragua 1911 Díaz Disregarded/
Not Specified
1914 -3 73
Nicaragua 1937 Somoza Garcia Replacement 1942 -8 1
Nicaragua 1967 Somoza Debayle Replacement 1972 -8 31
Panama 1920 Porras Barahona Amendment 1920 -3 17
Paraguay 1880 Caballero Disregarded/
Not Specified
1882 -4 10




Peru 1919 Leguia Replacement 1923 -4 0
Peru 1933 Benavidez Disregarded/
Not Specified
1936 2 0
Rwanda 1973 Habyarimana Replacement 1990 -7 12
Sierra 
Leone
1968 Stevens Replacement 1978 1 0
Sudan 1989 Al-Bashir Replacement 2008 -7 0






Tajikistan 1992 Rakhmonov Amendment 2003 -6 0
Togo 1967 Eyadema Amendment 2002 -7 7
Tunisia 1957 Bourguiba Amendment 1969
Tunisia 1987 Ben Ali Amendment 2004 -5 0
Uganda 1986 Museveni Amendment 2005 -7 0




Uzbekistan 1991 Karimov Amendment 1997 -9 0
Venezuela 1870 Guzman Blanco Replacement 1873 -5 40
Venezuela 1879 Guzman Blanco Replacement 1881 -5 49
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Venezuela 1894 Joaquin Crespo Replacement 1894 -3 64
Venezuela 1899 Cipriano Castro Replacement 1902 -3 69
Venezuela 1908 Gomez Replacement 1913 -3 78
Yugoslavia
(Serbia)
1945 Tito Amendment 1972 -7 0
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Private law—the law of torts, contracts, and property—is at an
interpretive impasse. The two leading conceptual theories of private
law—corrective justice and civil recourse theories—both suffer from
significant weaknesses. Given these concerns, private law may even
seem incoherent. The problem is not insurmountable, however. This
Article offers a new way to understand private law. I will argue that
private law is best understood as a means for individuals to exercise
their moral enforcement rights.
Moral enforcement rights exist when an individual may legiti-
mately use coercion to force another individual to comply with his or
her moral duties. Not all interpersonal relationships implicate moral
enforcement rights. However, when moral enforcement rights do
exist, the law typically provides a private right of action. Indeed, the
private right of action fills an important need, given the backdrop of
existing legal regulation. Individuals usually may not coerce a
wrongdoer on their own, and thus require some other mechanism to
do so. The private right of action can be seen as a substitute means
of enforcement given that the state ordinarily prohibits self-help.
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